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Abstract
The papers in this thesis cover a variety of ideas. They are united by the common theme
of carefully observing existing relationships in data. In the first chapter, I find that
looking at averages can be insufficient. On average, there is not a strong relationship
between an individual’s ability and her tolerance of risk. However, the joint distribution
of the two characteristics shows a great deal of heterogeneity that the average masks.
The highest ability individuals are most likely to report middle levels of risk tolerance,
whereas those of lower ability are also likely to report extreme values. For those of high
ability, therefore, insufficient risk tolerance may prevent them from starting their own
business. In the second chapter, I illustrate and quantify the efficiency gain that results
from accounting for nonlinearities in the first stage of 2SLS when estimating the second
stage parameters of interest. Additionally, I show that in some cases estimating nonlinearly
can prevent incorrect inference resulting from misestimation of the underlying first stage
data generating process when using a linear method. In the third chapter, I observe
and attempt to explain a behavioral puzzle. A standard screening question for rational
decision-making screens out a large minority of the sample. Since so many people are
affected, it is unlikely to be due to noise or measurement error. I take the answers seriously
and develop an explanation.
2
Contents
1 Ability, Risk Tolerance, and Entrepreneurship 9
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.2.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.2.2 What is entrepreneurship? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2.3 Risk preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3 Ability, risk tolerance, and entrepreneurship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4.1 LR model summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4.2 Digging deeper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.4.3 Extending the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.4.4 Nudging into entrepreneurship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.5 Model estimation and counterfactuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.5.1 Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.5.2 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.5.3 Counterfactuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3
2 Nonlinearities in 2SLS 47
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.2.1 Flexibility of nonlinear models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.2.2 Estimation of nonlinear models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.2.3 Comparing neural network with LASSO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.3 Simulating data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.3.1 Basic set-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.3.2 Generating bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.4 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.5.1 Continuous endogenous variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.5.2 Weak instrument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.5.3 Dummy endogenous variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.6 Discussion: extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.6.1 Variance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.6.2 Statistical significance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.6.3 More complicated models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3 Suboptimal Decision-Making on Stochastic Lotteries in Indonesia 85
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.2 Possible Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4
3.4 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.5 Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.6 Future research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5
List of Figures
1.1 Likelihood of entrepreneurship by AFQT score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.2 Likelihood of entrepreneurship by risk tolerance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3 Distributions of ability and risk preferences in both samples . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4 Average ability by risk tolerance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.5 Distributions of incorporated entrepreneurship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.6 Levine and Rubinstein model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.7 Impact of ability on P(entrepreneurship) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.8 Distribution of ability and risk tolerance by sex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.1 LASSO vs NN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.2 Linear DGP, low noise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.3 Linear DGP, high noise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.4 Logistic DGP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.5 Sinusoid2 (sine) DGP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.6 Quadratic DGP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.7 Sinusoid (cosine) DGP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.8 Weak instrument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.9 Probit (linear DGP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
6
2.10 Probit, DGP fit examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.11 Probit, DGP βˆ histograms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.12 Probit, DGP instrument strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
7
List of Tables
1.1 Noncognitive characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2 Marginal effects associated with entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3 Relationship between risk tolerance and ability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.4 Nudging into entrepreneurship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.5 Changes in pool of entrepreneurs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.6 Probit regression - selection into entrepreneurship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.1 Functional forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.2 MSE(f) from first stage estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.3 Bias-variance trade-off: MSE(βˆ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.1 Likelihood of choosing stochastically dominated option . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.2 Impact of loss aversion on savings/investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
8
Chapter 1
Ability, Risk Tolerance, and
Entrepreneurship
1.1 Introduction
Economists have long considered ability to be essential to entrepreneurship. Schumpeter
cast the entrepreneur as an innovator, positing that the amount of entrepreneurship ob-
served directly relates to the “quality of the personnel available in a society” (Schumpeter,
1947). More recent work, such as Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Levine and Rubin-
stein (2018), emphasizes the impact of intellectual ability on the choice to become an
entrepreneur as well as performance once having started one’s own business.
We would thus expect that increasing ability would always have a positive impact on entry
into entrepreneurship. Indeed, both above-mentioned papers model ability as an input into
the entrepreneur’s production function and ensure that the probability of choosing that
career over salaried employment increases with ability.
However, in two separate cohorts from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY),
I observe that the marginal effect of ability on the probability of pursuing entrepreneurship
is positive only up to a point, and further increases in ability do not result in higher rates
of entry. Put differently, a person of average intellect is as likely to be an incorporated
business owner as is someone at the high end of the scale. How can we reconcile this
observation with the models?
Cognitive skill is not the only personal characteristic that affects career choices. Prior
empirical work suggests that a variety of noncognitive personality traits influence who
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chooses to become an entrepreneur and their success in this endeavour (de Meza and
Southey, 1996; Hurst and Pugsley, 2011). If ability and another trait are jointly de-
termined in the population, as intellectual ability increases across individuals, the other
trait would not remain constant. If both characteristics influence the probability of en-
trepreneurship, it is possible for the total derivative – total impact via direct and indirect
channels, which is what we see in raw data – with respect to ability to be zero even while
the partial derivative (direct impact of ability ceteris paribus) is positive.
I argue that risk tolerance is the relevant trait, accounting for which resolves the discrep-
ancy between models and observation. Levine and Rubinstein (2018) extend their main
model to include the direct impact of risk tolerance as well as ability on career choice
(the only paper to do so, to the best of my knowledge), modeling each partial derivative
as positive. Their approach implicitly assumes the two traits are either independently
determined, or at most correlated. If positively correlated, the total derivative would
be larger than the partial; if negatively correlated, it would be smaller. Regardless, we
would observe a continuous increase (or possibly decrease) across the whole support, not
a change from positive slope to zero.1 To account for such a change we need a change
in the correlation between risk tolerance and cognitive skills part of the way through the
support – in other words, a nonlinear relationship, which here takes an inverse-U shape.
The main message of this paper is that cognitive skill and risk tolerance are not separable,
but instead are jointly determined, and the relationship between them cannot be captured
by a simple correlation, as it is nonlinear. Both traits appear relevant for self-selection
into entrepreneurship and thus must be considered simultaneously to robustly model and
estimate the impact of either. This insight helps to explain part of the gender gap in new
business formation, and may be important when designing policies intended to encourage
start-up formation.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and necessary
background. Section 3 documents the empirical observations. Section 4 describes the
Levine and Rubinstein model and extends it to account for the puzzle observed. Section
5 estimates the model and several counterfactual scenarios. Section 6 concludes.
1Such a change could be expected if we were nearing P(entrepreneurship)=1, but this is not the case
in the data.
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1.2 Background
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is important to establish what I mean by “en-
trepreneur”, as this word can be used to describe different kinds of economic activity. For
reasons laid out below, the definition used in this paper is an individual self-employed in
an incorporated business. It is also necessary to discuss the measure of risk tolerance used
in the analysis, as there are multiple potential ways in which it can be measured. I begin
by describing the NLSY data.
1.2.1 Data
The two datasets that I use are the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 cohort
and 1997 cohort (NLSY79 and NLSY97). These are two longitudinal studies following
cohorts representative of the US population born in 1957-1964 and in 1980-1984 over
multiple years. What is particularly useful about these datasets for my analysis is that
aside from data on employment, most participants also took an exam to measure their
intellectual ability. Additionally, there is data on some of the participants’ noncognitive
characteristics.
My measure of intellectual ability is the same as that used by Levine and Rubinstein
(2017), the individuals’ results on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB),
and in particular their performance on the following subsections: Mathematical Knowl-
edge, Arithmetic Reasoning, Word Knowledge, and Paragraph Comprehension. Together,
these subsections are known as the Armed Forces Qualifying Test, or AFQT. A cumulative
performance score ranging from 0 to 100 is available for both cohorts. This is a standard-
ized intelligence test developed by the US Armed Forces, which pioneered standardized
testing at the beginning of the 20th century (Gallagher, 2003).
The test was administered to participants when they were teenagers, at the beginning of
the longitudinal surveys. Data on risk preferences (discussed below) was collected later,
once participants had reached adulthood. Both datasets additionally collect information
in each wave on employment in the previous year, as well as many other indicators.
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1.2.2 What is entrepreneurship?
In this paper, I define an entrepreneur as an individual who reports being self-employed
in an incorporated business in the NLSY survey. The reasoning for this is twofold. First
of all, the literature seems to have converged toward this definition (discussed below).
The second reason is that transformative, innovative companies – those rare enterprises
the inception of which governments wish to encourage – are a subset of all incorporated
businesses. Arguably, a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for starting such a
company is a high degree of mental acuity. If risk aversion constrains high ability people
from entering incorporated entrepreneurship, it may also constrain them from entering
transformative entrepreneurship, which is surely an even more uncertain pursuit. This
could have policy and welfare implications.
It has previously been shown that employees at a start-up tend to have more patent
applications than do employees at established firms (Sauermann, 2017). Even though
established companies also do engage in R&D, and occasionally may even produce some-
thing completely new rather than just marginal improvements, it may be more difficult for
established firms to develop and utilize radical rather than incremental innovations due to
organizational constraints (Henderson and Clark, 1990). Many large tech companies such
as Google expand their knowledge and enter new areas of operation by buying promising
start-ups, for example, Deep Mind. As there is some evidence that most of the benefits
of technological change are passed on to the rest of society rather than internalized by
the individual inventor, their partners, or their financial backers (A˚stebro et al., 2014,
Nordhaus, 2004), it is in the interest of all of us that the most capable among us innovate
and push their ideas into the market.
The innovation and growth aspect of entrepreneurship has been of interest to economists
since research in this field began. Schumpeter (1947) first defined the function of the
entrepreneur as “...the doing of new things or the doing of things that are already being
done in a new way (innovation).” While Knight (1921) did not emphasize invention, he
still characterized entrepreneurs as exceptional contributors to economic growth: people
who can perceive opportunities more clearly than can others in a world of unpredictable
uncertainties, and thus are able to go into business and generate profits. Many theories
have cast the entrepreneur as a main driver of economic growth (Baumol, 1990, Murphy
et al., 1991, Vandenbussche et al., 2006, Gennaioli et al., 2013).
Empirical verification of the above theories initially simply utilized those who are self-
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employed as a proxy for entrepreneurs. However, it emerged that those who are self-
employed do not appear to be so different from those who are salaried (Evans and Leighton,
1989; Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002; Hamilton, 2000). On average, the self-
employed do not appear to be exceptional in any observable way – they are not more
highly educated, they do not earn more, they are not much younger or older than are
the salaried (Levine and Rubinstein, 2017). Additionally, most small businesses do not
require very much start-up capital, remain small, and do not aim to grow or become
transformative (Hurst and Pugsley, 2011).
Initial attempts to resolve the disconnect between the theorized and observed business
owner suggested that perhaps entrepreneurship is not as exceptional an activity as ini-
tially supposed, and that the selection criteria into entrepreneurship may be based simply
on the appeal of the job to some people. This research emphasizes the potential importance
of noncognitive traits in shaping career choices. Work by de Meza and Southey (1996)
suggests that those who enter into entrepreneurship are overly optimistic and overconfi-
dent, expecting good outcomes more frequently than they get realized, especially when
being in control. Hurst and Pugsley (2011) argue that non-pecuniary benefits, such as the
opportunity to be one’s own boss, play a first-order role in the business formation decision.
If such preferences are randomly distributed in a population and are what leads to entry,
then certainly the self-employed and the salaried would not look very different. Lazear
(2004) proposes a different hypothesis, that entrepreneurs are people who are jacks-of-all-
trades with balanced skill sets. In his view, specialists are better off seeking employment,
whereas generalists do well as business owners.
Levine and Rubinstein (2017) reconcile the theory with the empirical observations by
arguing that not all those who are self-employed should be considered entrepreneurs.
They draw the distinction between the unincorporated self-employed and the incorporated
“true” entrepreneurs, showing that it is the latter who engage in analytical rather than
manual work and “open businesses that are more closely aligned with core conceptions of
entrepreneurship than the unincorporated.” I therefore utilize this distinction and define
entrepreneurs as those who are self-employed in an incorporated business.
1.2.3 Risk preferences
The measure of risk aversion that I use is a self-assessed measure on a 0-10 scale (the
11-point Likert scale), 0 corresponding to most risk averse and 10 corresponding to the
most risk tolerant. While this may at first seem questionable, there is prior work showing
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that people are good at assessing their own tolerance for risk. Such a measure predicts
individuals’ performance in incentivized experiments to assess risk aversion, as well as
engagement in actual risky activities (Dohmen et al., 2005; Dohmen et al., 2011; Falk
et al., 2015). In the NLSY data, risk preferences are elicited in this way at most once per
individual, and the measure is taken when participants are adults in the middle of their
careers.
The above may be a concern, but there is evidence that personality characteristics, and
in particular risk aversion, are (somewhat) stable over the adult life span (Galizzi et al.,
2016). Schildberg-Ho¨risch (2018) provides an overview of the available evidence. The main
message that emerges from that work is that, “Individual risk preferences appear to be
persistent and moderately stable over time, [although] their degree of stability is too low
to be reconciled with the assumption of perfect stability in neoclassical economic theory.”
In particular, there is some evidence of systematic change in risk preference with age –
children tend to be much less risk averse than adults (Levin et al., 2007; Moreira et al.,
2010; Paulsen et al., 2011), and after reaching adulthood, as one gets older, one tends
to slowly become more risk averse (Sahm, 2012; Dohmen et al., 2017; Josef et al., 2016;
Schurer, 2015). However, while the reported level of risk tolerance gradually decreases,
the ordering of individuals within a population remains quite stable. Therefore, although
risk preferences are elicited in the NLSY surveys after people have been active in their
careers, as opposed to being measured at the onset of adulthood, I believe it is still an
informative measure. Since these surveys follow a particular cohort, age effects within
each cohort should be minimal and the responses should reflect a true ordering between
the different individuals. Partly for this reason, I do not pool the two samples but analyze
each separately.
One further consideration regarding the risk measure I use is whether it may be the case
that it is not risk tolerant people who enter into entrepreneurship, but it is entrepreneur-
ship itself that makes people less risk averse. This would mean that when I observe people’s
risk attitudes in the middle or towards the end of their careers, these would be the re-
sult of the career choices they had already made, not characteristics that influenced their
decisions initially. This seems unlikely to be the case. It is unclear why someone who is
initially risk averse would undertake a risky endeavour such as starting their own business
in the first place, and later show up as being tolerant of risk. Whether risk tolerance is a
factor in who becomes an entrepreneur at all is not definitively settled in the literature.
However, studies comparing entrepreneur and non-entrepreneur samples either find that
entrepreneurs are on average less risk averse, or no significant difference (Caliendo et al.
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(2009), Fairlie (2002), Hvide and Panos (2014), Ahn (2010), Holm et al. (2013)); the
literature demonstrates that it is never the case that those who start their own businesses
are more risk averse than the average population. In addition, it seems strange to suppose
that one’s level of risk tolerance does not play a role in making the decision of whether to
enter entrepreneurship or not, considering that we usually frame decision-making in terms
of expected utility. Surely when an individual considers their perceived costs and benefits
of being a salaried employee or starting their own business and the likelihood of success,
risk attitudes must come into play.
There is one paper which argues that entrepreneurship does make individuals more tolerant
of risk, Brachert and Hyll (2014). Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(SOEP), the authors show that measures of occupational risk tolerance decrease slightly
for the general population between two measurements, in 2004 and 2009, but that they
slightly increase for those who become self-employed in the intervening five years. However,
the average level of risk tolerance among those who become self-employed is higher than
for those who do not (a larger difference than the decrease over time), and slightly higher
still for those who were already entrepreneurs in 2004 (for whom there is on average a
slight decrease in 2009). In addition, the sample sizes are quite small, so the observed
differences may possibly be due to measurement error or in the selection of the particular
sample. Overall, it appears that risk tolerance is likely to be a factor in who chooses to
become an entrepreneur, and not that entry into self-employment systematically affects
an individual’s level of risk aversion.
1.3 Ability, risk tolerance, and entrepreneurship
The main observation of this paper is that highly able individuals may be constrained
from entering into incorporated entrepreneurship by their lack of sufficient risk tolerance.
Table 1.1 shows that on average, those of high ability (AFQT > 50) do not appear to be
at a disadvantage with regards to other noncognitive characteristics. They seem to have
better mental health, feel more in control of their lives, have higher self-esteem, and are
less likely to be shy. As described below, risk tolerance thus seems a more likely candidate
for an occupational choice friction.
Figure 1.1 shows the fraction of person-year observations in which people of each AFQT
category have been self-employed in an incorporated business, or in any business (including
unincorporated). This shows the importance of distinguishing between entrepreneurs and
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Noncognitive characteristics by ability
Characteristic Scale Low ability
High ability
difference
NLSY79
Rotter locus of control
4-16, lower=feel more in
control
9.174539 -1.395348∗∗∗
Rosenberg score
6-30, higher=higher
self-esteem
21.54127 2.269158∗∗∗
Sociability at age 6 1-4, low=shy 2.257194 .1897865∗∗∗
Sociability as adult 1-4, low=shy 2.862089 .0625491∗∗∗
Pearling mastery of own
fate
7-28, higher=greater
mastery
21.63789 1.284622∗∗∗
TIPI extroverted,
enthusiastic
1=disagree to 7=agree 5.079556 -.1059296∗∗
TIPI critical,
quarrelsome
1=disagree to 7=agree 3.309895 -.3508103∗∗∗
TIPI dependable,
self-disciplined
1=disagree to 7=agree 6.002038 -.0243869
TIPI anxious, easily
upset
1=disagree to 7=agree 3.408546 -.5287217∗∗∗
TIPI complex, open to
new experiences
1=disagree to 7=agree 5.267318 -.0633704
TIPI reserved, quiet 1=disagree to 7=agree 4.413255 -.6801557∗∗∗
TIPI sympathetic, warm 1=disagree to 7=agree 5.597597 -.1136268∗∗∗
TIPI disorganized,
careless
1=disagree to 7=agree 2.624067 -.2538915∗∗∗
TIPI calm, stable 1=disagree to 7=agree 5.432004 -.0385826
TIPI conventional,
uncreative
1=disagree to 7=agree 3.383318 -.1836707∗∗∗
NLSY97
Mental health
5-20, lower=more
emotional problems
13.42447 .5706225∗∗∗
TIPI extroverted,
enthusiastic
1=disagree to 7=agree 3.641159 .1680063∗
TIPI critical,
quarrelsome
1=disagree to 7=agree 2.140416 .0916625
TIPI dependable,
self-disciplined
1=disagree to 7=agree 4.425706 .0548179
TIPI anxious, easily
upset
1=disagree to 7=agree 2.464091 -.4791484∗∗∗
TIPI complex, open to
new experiences
1=disagree to 7=agree 4.078504 .1123305
TIPI reserved, quiet 1=disagree to 7=agree 2.736751 -.3066363∗∗∗
TIPI sympathetic, warm 1=disagree to 7=agree 3.836305 .222942∗∗
TIPI disorganized,
careless
1=disagree to 7=agree 1.527489 .1893688∗∗
TIPI calm, stable 1=disagree to 7=agree 3.85686 .1441222
TIPI conventional,
uncreative
1=disagree to 7=agree 1.657751 -.0819739
Table 1.1: Differences in noncognitive characteristics between higher and lower ability
individuals. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 1.1: Likelihood of entrepreneurship by AFQT score
Figure 1.2: Likelihood of entrepreneurship by risk tolerance
other self-employed. We see that while higher intellectual ability is associated with greater
entry into self-employment in general, its marginal impact on the likelihood of being an
incorporated entrepreneur is not stable. In particular, the marginal effect of ability is
positive for those who score 50 or below – the fraction of person-years increases with
AFQT score – but it is statistically indistinguishable from zero for those who score above
50 (shown in Table 1.2). Someone who scores a perfect score on the AFQT thus seems as
likely to become an incorporated entrepreneur as someone who only scores half the marks.
A useful question to ask here is what benchmark shape we should expect to see. If
increasing cognitive skills increases the probability of entrepreneurship, and if ability is
determined independently of any other characteristic, the shape should trace out part of
a CDF-like curve2. Only part because even the highest levels of ability in the sample are
insufficient to guarantee pursuing entrepreneurship; the highest probability is still lower
than even 5%. We would thus expect to see a convex, increasing shape. Instead, we
observe a concave shape, indicating that one or both of the above-mentioned assumptions
must not hold.
2Further discussion in Section 1.4
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Figure 1.2 shows that risk tolerance is more in line with the benchmark. The fraction of
person-year observations where an individual is engaged in running an incorporated busi-
ness remains flat for low levels of risk tolerance, and additional risk tolerance only increases
likelihood of entrepreneurship at higher levels. This is also true for self-employment in
general. Additionally, from figure 1.3 we can see that a greater proportion of the NLSY97
cohort consider themselves relatively risk tolerant than does the NLSY79 cohort, and
members of that cohort do appear to engage in self-employment (incorporated and not)
to a greater extent.
If risk tolerance positively influences entry into entrepreneurship, and if it decreases at
higher levels of AFQT, this would explain why the probability of entrepreneurship dips
to a flat shape as AFQT increases. At the same time, if AFQT positively influences
the probability someone becomes an entrepreneur, and it is lower at high levels of risk
tolerance, we would expect that to “pull down” the risk tolerance curve as well. Because
this curve appears to be “pulled down” less, this may indicate that risk tolerance has a
larger direct impact on who becomes an entrepreneur than does cognitive skill.
Table 1.2 shows estimates of the slopes illustrated in figures 1.1 and 1.2. The correlation
between higher ability (AFQT) and likelihood of entering into incorporated entrepreneur-
ship is positive and statistically significant for low values of AFQT, but the estimated
coefficients are an order of magnitude lower and not statistically significant for high values
of AFQT – a concave shape. The point estimate is actually negative for the NLSY97
cohort. The opposite is true for risk tolerance. At low values, a marginal increase in risk
tolerance is not associated with any higher participation in incorporated entrepreneurship,
but there is a positive and statistically significant effect for those whose value of risk tol-
erance is 5 or higher. To get a sense of the magnitude of the estimates, the mean value of
the incorporated variable (fraction of person-years incorporated) is 0.00826 in the NLSY79
and 0.01225 in the NLSY97. The slope on low values of AFQT can thus be interpreted as
an increase of 17% of the average value for a 10 point increase in AFQT in the NLSY79,
and an increase of 9.5% of the average value in the NLSY97.
To see why too-low risk tolerance likely hinders the mostly highly able individuals from
pursuing a career as an entrepreneur, we need to look at the joint distribution of the two
characteristics. This is shown for both samples in figure 1.3. The nonlinear nature of
the relationship becomes apparent and is summarized in figure 1.4, an inverse-U shape.
Essentially, the variance of risk tolerance decreases with ability. For both cohorts, the
distribution is trimodal at low levels of AFQT, but becomes unimodal as AFQT increases.
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Marginal effects associated with entry
NLSY79 Low values High values
AFQT
.000142∗∗∗ .0000392
(.0000307) (.0000532)
Risk tolerance
.0003234 .0020571∗∗∗
(.0003641) (.0003591)
NLSY97 Low values High values
AFQT
.0001165∗∗ -.0000172
(.0000545) (.0000859)
Risk tolerance
.000122 .0031404∗∗∗
(.000599) (.0004889)
Table 1.2: Results showing the relationships described in figures 1.1 and 1.2. The table
shows the estimated marginal effects of risk tolerance and ability on entry into incorporated
entrepreneurship estimated using simple OLS with a single regressor (plus constant) and
standard errors clustered at the individual level. ’Low values’ indicates AFQT ≤ 50 or
risk tolerance < 5, and ’high values’ indicates AFQT > 50 or risk tolerance ≥ 5. Standard
errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Figure 1.3: Distributions of ability and risk preferences in both samples
As ability increases, relatively fewer and fewer individuals can be found at either extreme
of risk preferences. Additionally, there are fewer individuals who score highly on the
AFQT than there are those whose score is lower. Not only is the distribution of ability
skewed, but few of the highly able are highly risk tolerant. Thus risk tolerance is likely to
have particularly strong repercussions for how many high-skill entrepreneurs there are.
In both of the data sets, those who score below 20 on the AFQT are much more likely
to report a 0 or a 10 level of risk tolerance than those who score above 80. The pattern
generally holds across the ability distribution. In the NLSY79, the proportion of people
who report a risk tolerance value of 8 or above (so, those individuals who are least risk
averse) among those who score under 20 on the AFQT is .25. Among those scoring 21-40
this is .17, 41-60 it is .16, 61-80 it is .14, and above 80 the fraction is .15. In each successive
group there are fewer and fewer individuals, as more people have lower scores than have
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Figure 1.4: Average AFQT score at different levels of risk tolerance
higher scores. For the NLSY97, the corresponding proportions are .31, .25, .19, .19, and
.17. Again, each successive group is smaller than the previous one.
Researchers have previously investigated the relationship between intelligence and risk
tolerance (Dohmen et al., 2010; Oechssler et al., 2009; Frederick, 2005; Benjamin et al.,
2013), finding some evidence of a positive correlation. In the NLSY79, it is true that
there is overall a slight but statistically significant positive correlation. In the NLSY97,
the correlation is very close to 0 and not statistically significant. What the literature has
not considered, to the best of my knowledge, is that the relationship is actually nonlinear,
as can be seen in figure 1.4 – the correlation is positive at low levels of risk tolerance and
becomes negative once risk tolerance increases beyond 5. It is also clear from figure 1.3 that
more important than the change in average risk preferences is the striking heterogeneity
of preferences at different levels of intellectual ability. It is not that more and less able
people differ so much in their risk tolerance on average, but the less able people tend more
towards the extremes, whereas those of higher ability tend to report middle values. Of
course, it is possible that this pattern comes about precisely because those of lower ability
over-simplify or those of higher ability over-analyze, but I see no reason why they would
do so in their survey answers and not in the way they approach choices in their lives. The
fact that this heterogeneity is clearly observable in the data for both cohorts indicates
that this may be a fundamental quality of how human attitudes toward risk vary with
intelligence, and bears further investigation in future research.
Table 1.3 demonstrates the statistical significance of the inverse-U shape shown in Figure
1.4. It is possible to model the relationship between risk tolerance and ability quadratically
or using some other functional form. However, the main feature for which it is necessary
to account in order to use both as regressors in a linear model that produces meaningful
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coefficient estimates is the change in correlation from positive to negative along the risk
tolerance support. The simplest way of doing this is to allow for the correlation between
the two features to be different when risk tolerance is low and when it is high. I use 5 as
the cut-off value, since that is close to the average value of risk tolerance at all levels of
AFQT.
Relationship between risk tolerance and ability
NLSY79 Unconditional Cond. (risk tol. > 5) Cond. (risk tol. ≤ 5)
AFQT
.0059464∗∗∗ .0059808∗∗∗ -.0152987∗∗∗ -.0113716∗∗∗ .0170295∗∗∗ .0125196∗∗∗
(.0011878) (.0016345) (.000872) (.0012718) (.0002001) (.0002760)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
NLSY97 Unconditional Cond. (risk tol. > 5) Cond. (risk tol. ≤ 5)
AFQT
-.0009333 .0000515 -.0137781∗∗∗ -.0102702∗∗∗ .008745∗∗∗ .0057604∗∗∗
(.0011061) (.0015296) (.0008294) (.0011972) (.0002407) (.0003348)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Table 1.3: Individual-level regression of risk tolerance on AFQT score. Note that the
conditional results are not sensitive to choice of cut-off value. Controls included are:
the respondent’s family’s income in childhood, whether it was a two-parent household,
mother’s and father’s education, and race and sex dummies. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
The first two columns of Table 1.3 show the average change in risk tolerance with AFQT,
with and without controlling for other characteristics. The controls included are: the
family income when the respondent was a child3, whether the respondent grew up in a
two-parent household, the mother’s and father’s education, and dummies for race and sex.
While there is an overall small but statistically significant increase in risk tolerance with
AFQT in the NLSY79 data, this is not the case in the NLSY97. These unconditional
estimates mask the important nonlinearity present in the data, averaging together highly
statistically significant positive and negative slopes. These can be seen in the last four
columns of Table 1.3.
To put everything together, figure 1.5 displays where entrepreneurs can be found in two
different ways. Subfigures 1.5(a) and 1.5(c) display the total number of person-years in
which people of a particular level of AFQT and risk tolerance report running their own
incorporated business divided by the total number of person-years in the sample. We can
immediately see how rare entrepreneurship is in both samples. We also see that there
are very few entrepreneurs below a particular level of risk – it seems to be a phenomenon
primarily found in the population of those who consider themselves to be a 5 or higher on
the risk scale. This pattern is particularly striking in the NLSY97 distribution, but can
also be seen in the NLSY79.
3I take the family income data reported in 1979 or 1997, depending on the data set, and if it is missing,
I take the data from one or two years later, all converted to 2010 dollars.
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(a) Absolute distribution, NLSY79 (b) Relative distribution, NLSY79
(c) Absolute distribution, NLSY97 (d) Relative distribution, NLSY97
Figure 1.5: Distribution of incorporated entrepreneurship in both samples. Figures labeled
‘absolute’ show the number of entrepreneur person-year observations in each box as a
fraction of the entire sample. Figures labeled ‘relative’ show the proportion of person-
years as a fraction of the total person-years that fall in that box.
Subfigures 1.5(b) and 1.5(d) account for the fact that there is a different total number of
people with each pair of values (within each box) and show where entrepreneurs are rel-
atively over- and underrepresented. The values displayed are the number of incorporated
person-years in a given box as a fraction of total person-years in that box4. These subfig-
ures give some idea of the surface we would like to estimate – the expected probability of
entrepreneurship for an individual with a given level of risk tolerance and cognitive ability.
4The number of person-year observations in each box differs partly because some combinations are
more prevalent than others and partly because individuals may be missing some years of data.
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1.4 Model
The model proposed by Levine and Rubinstein (2018) (henceforth LR) can help us to esti-
mate the surface of interest. I begin by summarizing the model as presented in the paper
and then offer an extension to reason about the observations presented in the previous
section.
1.4.1 LR model summary
LR model the choice to enter into (incorporated) entrepreneurship, salaried employment,
or (unincorporated) self-employment. They show that under risk neutrality, entrepreneurs
are selected positively on cognitive ability, whereas self-employed individuals are selected
negatively. LR offer an extension of the model that accounts for risk aversion and show
that including this does not qualitatively alter the self-selection into careers. The extension
only changes the levels of the relevant ability cut-offs, keeping the ordering the same. LR
thus focus on the insights that they can generate using the risk-neutral model. This paper
argues that the way the ability cut-off changes with risk tolerance interlinks with the joint
distribution of both characteristics in an important way, so I focus on LR’s extended model
– in particular, on the choice between entrepreneurship and salaried employment, as in
the LR model it is the lowest-ability individuals who select into self-employment, and that
choice is unaffected by risk preferences.
LR define an individual’s constant absolute risk aversion utility function in the following
way:
VJi = − exp (−τi · IJi · exp (δJi)), J ∈ {E,S, U} (1.1)
where the letters correspond to being an entrepreneur, salaried, or self-employed, respec-
tively. IJi is the individual’s income. The parameter τi describes the degree of risk
aversion, taking positive values for risk averse individuals and decreasing towards 0 as the
utility function nears risk neutrality. The parameter δJi describes the nonpecuniary ben-
efits of each career choice; LR set δEi = 0, so the values are relative to entrepreneurship.
In entrepreneurship, the production function is:
Yi = θiK
α
i (1 + νi), νi ∼ N
(
0,
σ2
θiKαi
)
(1.2)
The expression for the variance of the productivity shock comes from the assumption that
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the variance-to-mean ratio of output is constant, so that splitting a firm does not affect the
variance of the aggregate output. In the above, θi denotes an individual’s entrepreneurial
ability, and Ki is the amount of capital the individual chooses to invest into production.
Income IEi is modeled in the standard way as Yi − rKi, where r is an interest rate higher
than 1. By plugging these expressions into the utility function and taking the expected
value, we get the following:
E{VEi} = − exp(−τi · {
(
1− τiσ
2
2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
γi
·θiKαi − rKi}) (1.3)
Maximizing expected utility, the entrepreneur sets the optimal level of capital:
K∗i =
(
αθiγi
r
) 1
1−α
(1.4)
γ is a convenient shorthand summarizing the combined impact of both risk preferences
(τ) and the risk inherent in production (σ2); it increases in risk tolerance and decreases in
risk. Note that in the model, the value of γ is constrained to be between 0 and 1 for en-
trepreneurs. Indifference between salaried employment and entrepreneurship occurs when
the expected utility of entrepreneurship, evaluated at K∗, is equal to the nonstochastic
utility of salaried employment. The income from salaried employment is equal to one’s
effective human capital, θρJi · eJi . Here Ji represents employment-specific skills and is 0
for entrepreneurship while being (on average) positive for other types of employment. It is
assumed to be uncorrelated with ability. LR allow “abilities useful in entrepreneurship to
also be productive in salaried employment” and assume 0 ≤ ρU < ρS ≤ 1. E{VEi} = VSi
when the following holds true:
− exp(−τi · {γi · θiK∗i α − rK∗i }) = − exp(−τi · {eδSi · θρSi · eSi}) ⇒
⇒ θρS− 11−α =
(α
r
) α
1−α
(1− α) · γ 11−α · exp(−δSi − Si)
(1.5)
When the left-hand side is smaller than the right-hand side, an individual chooses to
enter into incorporated entrepreneurship. Otherwise, they will choose salaried employment
(assuming their ability is not below the cut-off at which they choose self-employment,
θi < exp{
[
(δUi− δSi) + (Ui− Si)
]
/ρS}). Figure 1.6 shows what the decision looks like for
any individuals who share the same values of α, ρS , r, δSi, and Si. If the person’s values of
θ and γ are in the shaded region, it is optimal for that person to become an entrepreneur;
in the white area, they maximize expected utility by choosing salaried employment (or
self-employment at low levels of ability). The figure also shows that in the corresponding
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log-log plot, the relationship is linear rather than curved; this is a useful observation for
later estimation of the model.
γ
θ
ln(γ)
ln(θ)
Figure 1.6: The shape of the blue shaded area shows the range of ability and risk toler-
ance in which an individual with particular parameter values would choose to enter into
incorporated entrepreneurship in the LR model.
1.4.2 Digging deeper
The LR model, as presented, gives us a cut-off value based on which an individual will
make her career decision. This is informative, but it does not let us reason about the
change in the probability of entrepreneurship as ability or risk tolerance increase (Figures
1.1 and 1.2). The model described in the previous section predicts that below a certain
point, the probability is zero, and beyond that point, the probability jumps to 1. This does
not answer how we should expect the gradient to behave with respect to the two features
of interest, either the partial derivatives or the total derivatives. An understanding of
the shape of the surface that generates the indifference cut-off is necessary to connect the
model to the empirical observations.
We can use the LR model to think about how the probability of entrepreneurship responds
to increasing ability or increasing risk tolerance by keeping track of the stochastic element
in the model. The resulting probability expression describes a shape for the surface shown
in Subfigures 1.5(b) and 1.5(d) – assuming that the other parameters are determined
independently of ability and risk tolerance. Under that assumption, different individuals
can be valid counterfactuals for each other in expectation, differing only on the quantities
of interest. I focus my analysis on ability and risk tolerance, but the same approach can
be used to reason about the effects of relaxing this assumption and the impact of other
parameter changes.
I begin by deriving the expression for P (VE > VS), the probability that the utility one
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realizes in entrepreneurship is higher than that obtainable in salaried employment. We
can simplify this problem by noting this is equivalent to P (IE > e
δS · IS), as the utility
is a strictly increasing transformation of those two values. To get IE , the income of the
entrepreneur, we need the amount she produces. The would-be entrepreneur sets her
optimal level of capital as before, based on expected utility; if she puts that capital into
production, she will actually produce θK∗α(1 + ν), the value of which depends on the
realization of ν. IE is thus a stochastic object, a linear transformation of the normally-
distributed ν.
Plugging in the expressions for income in each occupation gives the following:
P (IE > e
δS · IS) = P
((
αγ
r
) α
1−α
θ
1
1−α (1 + ν − αγ) > eδS · θρs · eS
)
(1.6)
This expression can now be rearranged with the stochastic ν on the left and all the other
terms on the right:
P
(
ν > eδS+S
(
αγ
r
) −α
1−α
θρS−
1
1−α + αγ − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
RHS
)
(1.7)
The above expression describes a surface, a normal CDF on a multivariate support. It
gives the probability that realized utility in entrepreneurship is higher than salaried utility
for each combination of parameter values. The point at which an individual is indifferent
between the two occupations depends on that person’s level of risk tolerance. A risk-
neutral person would be indifferent when the probability is .5. Someone more risk-averse
would need a better-than-even chance that VE turns out higher and would prefer the
nonstochastic salaried option if the odds were 50-50. When the RHS is set equal to γ− 1,
we get back the indifference expression in equation 1.5. Note that γ ∈ (0, 1) and increases
in risk tolerance. When γ → 1, the RHS → 0, so P (VE > VS) ≈ .5. As risk tolerance
decreases towards zero5, this probability needs to increase in order for the person to remain
indifferent.
The variance of ν depends on ability and on the capital used in production, making it
difficult to reason about the ability gradient. To account for this, we can transform the
left-hand side to produce a standard normal. Let z ≡ √θK∗αν such that z ∼ N (0, 1).
5Values of γ below 0 are not prohibited in the model, but those individuals would prefer to invest a
negative amount of capital into production, so they are not entrepreneurs.
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P(
z >
(
eδS+S
(
αγ
r
) −α
1−α
θρS−
1
1−α + αγ − 1
)√
θ
1
1−α
(
αγ
r
) α
1−α
︸ ︷︷ ︸
RHS
)
(1.8)
As the RHS changes, this affects the probability that entrepreneurship is the better op-
tion. When the RHS is 0, the odds are 50-50 that VE turns out to be greater than VS .
Increasing the RHS decreases the probability of entrepreneurship, and decreasing it does
the opposite. We can visualize changes in the RHS as movements around the support un-
derneath a surface described by the CDF and observing how the height of surface changes.
Of particular interest are the gradients of this surface with respect to θ and γ.
So far we have not considered whether any of the elements that compose the RHS of
Equation 1.8 are at all related to each other. Implicitly, we have assumed that they are
not. Relations between variables are important because they affect the value of the total
derivative with respect to any variable that is not independent of some other variable. If
all variables are independent, then all total derivatives equal all partial derivatives. That
is, when I go along the surface in the direction of increasing variable x, the value of variable
y remains constant; it does not change as x changes. In other words, the impact on the
level of the surface occurs only through the direct impact of changing x. If instead y is
linked in some way to x, then it cannot remain constant as x changes. The impact on the
level then occurs both through the direct channel of x changing and the indirect channel
of y changing simultaneously.
Remember that the values we observe in Figure 1.1 show a total derivative. To reconcile
the puzzling observation with the predictions of the LR model, we need to extend the
model to allow for a relationship between cognitive skill and risk tolerance.
1.4.3 Extending the model
I first establish the predictions of the model in the case when θ and γ are independent.
In all cases I consider all other parameters to be determined independently of these two
characteristics.
To see how the value of the RHS in Equation 1.8 changes with θ, I plot6 the values of
the RHS as a function of θ. Specifically, I do this relative to the indifference cut-off,
subtracting its value from the RHS, as the z cut-off also changes with θ. This gives the
6The Desmos online graphing calculator is a useful tool for this.
27
relevant measure of where in the distribution one is, how far away one is from indifference.
For the remainder of the section, RHS will be used to mean this “net” RHS.
When θ is independent of all other parameters, the RHS steadily decreases in θ. This
means that the probability of entrepreneurship is predicted to steadily increase, tracing
out the full standard normal CDF as θ increases to infinity. As θ is in practice limited, we
would expect to observe just the initial part of this CDF. This is the benchmark shape
for Figure 1.1 that was discussed in Section 1.3.
The shape of the relationship between the RHS and θ is not qualitatively affected by
changes in the other parameters. As a reasonable starting point, I set δS + S = 0,
α = .33, ρS = .75, and r = 1.2. Varying the value of γ from 0 to 1 or changing the other
parameters still results in the RHS decreasing with θ, as we would expect.
Performing the same exercise with γ yields the same qualitative impact on the RHS – a
steady decrease. Both of these results make sense, as we expect the direct impact of each
characteristic to increase the probability of entrepreneurship in the model. The decreasing
slope with respect to θ is less steep than that with respect to γ. However, the support
of θ in the model is [0,∞), so it is not clear if here we can interpret θ as having a lower
direct impact on the probability of entrepreneurship. For this we would need a maximum
value of θ. Such a value certainly exists, although it is not specified in the LR model. The
empirical evidence I present in Section 1.5 is consistent with ability having a lower direct
impact on the likelihood of pursuing entrepreneurship than does risk tolerance.
I extend the LR model by linking the values of θ and γ, forcing them to be jointly deter-
mined, and then observe how the value of the RHS behaves when either value is changed. I
use the simplest functional form that accounts for the key nonlinearity described in Figure
1.47. Risk tolerance and ability increase together at low values of risk tolerance, and then
ability decreases as risk tolerance continue to increase.
γ(θ) =

n(θ −m)
1− n(θ −m)
θ(γ) =

1
nγ +m when γ ∈ (0, 0.5)
− 1nγ + (m+ 1n) when γ ∈ [0.5, 1]
Linking θ and γ imposes a restriction on the values θ can take. With the above functional
form, the lowest value of θ is m, which occurs when γ is either 0 or 1, and the highest
7One can add an error term to allow for a noisy nonlinear relationship between the two quantities, but
for the following analysis it is an unnecessary complication.
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value is θ = m + 12n , which occurs when γ = 0.5. I set m = 2 and n = 0.3, but again,
changing these values does not alter the qualitative behavior of the RHS described below.
First consider how the RHS varies with γ, the level of risk tolerance, when we allow a
changing γ to affect cognitive skills. As γ increases from 0 to 0.5, the RHS decreases, so
the probability of entrepreneurship increases in risk tolerance. As γ continues to increase,
the same generally continues to hold in most cases. It is possible to observe a U-shaped
RHS between 0.5 and 1 if ρS is very close to 0 (ability is not useful in salaried employment),
if α is very high (e.g. 0.95), or if δS+S is very high (e.g. 2.5, indicating that nonpecuniary
benefits of salaried employment relative to entrepreneurship are high and/or the individual
has very high salaried-employment-specific skills). Generally, however, the RHS steadily
decreases as risk tolerance increases, meaning the probability of entrepreneurship increases
as well. This is consistent with what we observe in figure 1.2.
To understand the impact of θ on the probability of entrepreneurship, we need to consider
the behavior of the RHS in two cases, when γ is low and when it is high. In the first
case, as θ increases, this is associated with an increase in γ as well. Both direct effects
reinforce each other. The RHS decreases, so the model predicts that the probability of
entrepreneurship will increase with cognitive skill.
In the second case, the opposite occurs. When γ is high, increasing θ decreases γ, over-
whelming the impact of higher ability. The RHS increases, so now the model predicts that
the probability of entrepreneurship will decrease with cognitive skill.
The overall marginal effect of increasing θ on the probability of entrepreneurship will be
the simple average of the two cases above. This is because by construction, each level of θ
corresponds to one low value of γ and to one high value of γ. Figure 1.7 shows the change
in the RHS that results from increasing θ:
At low levels of θ, increasing it drops the value of the RHS – the probability of entrepreneur-
ship increases. However, this soon levels off, and the value of the RHS remains flat as θ
continues to increase. The probability of entrepreneurship thus remains approximately
constant beyond middle levels of ability. Once again, this result is robust to changes in
other parameter values. The pattern in Figure 1.7 is exactly what we observe in Figure
1.1: those with the highest cognitive skills are about as likely to pursue entrepreneurship
as are those with average skills.
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Figure 1.7: Impact of ability on the “net” RHS of Equation 1.8 when ability and risk tol-
erance are not independently determined. The two vertical black lines show the minimum
and maximum values of θ. The decreasing dotted blue line shows the low-γ case. The
increasing dotted purple line shows the high-γ case. The solid orange line is the average
of the two.
1.4.4 Nudging into entrepreneurship
The model predicts that the direct impact of risk tolerance on the likelihood of pursuing
entrepreneurship is positive. That is, if an individual’s risk tolerance were to increase, she
would be more likely to start her own incorporated business. The risk tolerance measure
γ combines within it two concepts, the individual’s attitude towards risk, τ , and the
“riskiness” of entrepreneurship, σ2. Thus far we have disregarded the latter, treating it as
constant. However, while it may be difficult or impossible for a policy-maker to influence
an individual’s τ , it is much more feasible to shift γ upwards by lowering σ2, in other
words, providing support for a budding business.
Figure 1.5 shows us that most entrepreneurship occurs when individuals rate their level
of risk tolerance as 5 or higher – the high-γ portion of the distribution, where ability
and risk tolerance are inversely related. If we were to uniformly increase γ by making
entrepreneurship safer, the individuals who now choose to become entrepreneurs should
on average be of higher ability than those who already chose to incorporate with their
original value of γ. Loosening the γ constraint should thus allow people with a higher τ
to enter, and these people should on average have a higher θ as well.
An optimal way to determine whether it is possible to nudge high ability individuals into
incorporated entrepreneurship would be through a randomized controlled trial. The NLSY
data do not provide enough power for a detailed analysis using a natural experiment, but
I present some basic observations.
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Effect of riskiness on entry into entrepreneurship
NLSY79 logit FE OLS FE
Exit rate
-.0749551∗∗∗ -.2460391∗∗∗ -.0006184∗∗∗ -.0019191∗∗∗
(.0174027) (.0259045) (.0001377) (.0002006)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Number individuals 796 760 796 760
Number observations 14,658 13,664 14,658 13,664
NLSY97 logit FE OLS FE
Exit rate
-.0616624∗∗ -.1189491∗∗ -.0007525∗∗ -.0007357
(.0271838) (.0479704) (.0003017) (.000497)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Number individuals 559 450 559 450
Number observations 5,973 3,878 5,973 3,878
Table 1.4: A higher establishment exit rate in a given industry and year is associated with
a lower probability of incorporated entrepreneurship. Regressions reported above include
an individual fixed effect. Also reported are the number of marginal individuals who switch
in/out of entrepreneurship at some point during the study, on whom the estimates are
based. Controls included are income in the previous year (in thousands of 2010 dollars)
and industry dummies, as individuals can change industries. Income has a very small but
statistically significant positive effect on entrepreneurship participation. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
As a measure of “riskiness” of starting a business, I use data on the rate of establishments
in a particular industry exiting the market in a given year from the United States Census
Bureau. This value is based on data gathered across the country, so a single individual
would not be able to influence the measured rate. The rate of exit a person observes in
their industry each year is thus taken as given. If this measure is an adequate proxy for
the business climate, it should be associated with changes in the rate of entrepreneur-
ship in the NLSY samples. This is indeed the case. In a fixed effects logistic regression
of the probability of being an entrepreneur on the rate of exit, an increase in the exit
rate is associated with a lower likelihood of entrepreneurship. The fixed effects control
for individual-level characteristics that do not vary over time, including ability and risk
tolerance, and the estimates are based off of those marginal individuals who switch into
or out of entrepreneurship during the course of the study. I also report the results of OLS
estimation with individual fixed effects, and results including controls for the individual’s
previous year’s earnings and their industry, as people do change industries over the course
of their careers. It remains the case that the establishment exit rate is inversely associated
with entry into entrepreneurship.
As people enter and leave entrepreneurship, the characteristics of the pool of entrepreneurs
vary each year. We can see how changes in the “riskiness” of the business climate (i.e.
changes in σ2) affect the average AFQT and the average risk tolerance of those who choose
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to be entrepreneurs that year.
While these results are only indicative, it is interesting to see that as riskiness of run-
ning a business increases, so does the average risk tolerance of entrepreneurs (though not
significantly). Meanwhile the opposite holds true for ability. Thus, it is possible that by
decreasing the risk associated with running one’s own business, a greater number of highly
able people would enter, but further research is necessary.
Changes in pool of entrepreneurs
with increasing riskiness
AFQT Risk tolerance
NLSY79
-2.0198∗∗∗ .0203394
(.3698833) (.0418038)
n 1,528 1,313
NLSY97
-1.009317∗ .0142251
(.6054531) (.0450683)
n 824 1,005
Table 1.5: Regression of AFQT and of risk tolerance on the establishment exit rate, only
across those person-year observations in which the person is incorporated. Increasing exit
rate (riskiness) seems to decrease the average AFQT of entrepreneurs in both samples,
while increasing (not significantly) the average risk tolerance. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
1.5 Model estimation and counterfactuals
1.5.1 Specification
To estimate the model, I start with the indifference expression in Equation 1.5. As dis-
cussed in section 1.4.2, this defines the shape of the contour lines of the P (VE > VS)
surface in the θ-γ space. Along the curve described by the equation, the probability that
entrepreneurship produces greater utility than salaried employment remains a constant
value. If we change θ or γ and move off of this curve, the probability changes to a different
value – but now we find ourselves on a different indifference curve, which will still have
the same kind of shape.
By taking the natural log of both sides, we see that the expression becomes linear in ln θ
and ln γ:
(
ρS − 1
1− α
)
ln θ =
[
α
1− α ln
(
α
r
)
+ ln (1− α)− δS − S
]
+
(
1
1− α
)
ln γ (1.9)
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This means that in the transformed space, the indifference curves are linear, and we can
use a simple probit to estimate the surface above the ln θ-ln γ plane. Probit is appropriate
because the shape the model predicts is a normal CDF, as ν is distributed normally.
So far we have established that the probability of entrepreneurship is determined by a
linear combination of ln θ and ln γ:
P (Yit = 1|θi, γi) = Φ(β0 + β1 ln θi + β2 ln γi)
Estimating this directly, however, does not take into account the nonlinear relationship
between ability and risk tolerance. In order to be able to interpret the coefficients estimated
by a linear regression model as partial derivatives (direct effects), we need to allow the
correlation between the two characteristics to switch from positive to negative for low vs.
high values of risk tolerance. If we were to drop risk tolerance from the model, this would
impact the coefficient on ability in opposite ways depending on whether it is positively or
negatively correlated with risk tolerance – and this depends on the level of risk tolerance.
A simple change is needed:
P (Yit = 1|θi, γi) = Φ{β0 + β1(ln θi × 1[γi < γ¯]) + β2(ln θi × 1[γi ≥ γ¯]) + β3 ln γi} (1.10)
Based on the observation in Figure 1.3, I choose 5 as the γ¯ to use in estimation. To
estimate this model, we need to take logs of ability and risk tolerance, so zero values
are problematic. Fortunately, there is nothing fundamental about a value of 0 in either
variable – it is an arbitrarily-chosen lowest point. I thus adjust the variables so the new
lowest value is 1 before proceeding with the estimation.
1.5.2 Estimation
Table 1.6 reports the results. As in the discussion of the model, I ignore the unincorporated
self-employed, combining them with the salaried. The table includes estimates for each
cohort estimated in two different ways. The first keeps each observation at the person-year
level, so the dependent variable is entrepreneurship status in each year. To control for
changes to γ through σ2, I include the establishment exit rate described earlier. I also
include the individual’s entrepreneurship status in the previous year, as entrepreneurship
status is unlikely to be an i.i.d. process but instead depends on past experience. For these
regressions the standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
33
Probit regression - selection into entrepreneurship
NLSY79 NLSY97
Person-year Person Person-year Person
AFQT .0060408 -.0156233 -.0364986 .0281823
(low risk tolerance) (.0256918) (.0336081) (.0423733) (.0445010)
AFQT .0353375 .0563882∗ -.0080455 .0755322∗∗
(high risk tolerance) (.0245766) (.0317610) (.0374996) (.0384426)
Risk tolerance
.0627717 .0990755∗ .2971609∗∗ .2651479∗∗
(.0490613) (.0575332) (.1230023) (.1188887)
Entrepreneur previous year
1.990449∗∗∗
-
2.225054∗∗∗
-
(.0613140) (.0823398)
Income in past year .0017199∗∗∗
-
.0050779∗∗∗
-
(2010 $1000s) (.0002807) (.0008786)
Estab. exit rate -.0522084∗∗∗
-
-.0109014
-
(“riskiness”) (.0123320) (.0223669)
Childhood family income .0017718∗∗∗ .0020117∗∗∗ .0004714 .0007240
(2010 $1000s) (.0004696) (.0006562) (.0004785) (.0005521)
Two-parent HH
-.0528674 -.0999683∗ -.0545169 -.0098277
(.0381971) (.0525844) (.0547383) (.0611085)
Mother’s education
.0261786∗∗∗ .0428824∗∗∗ .0031917 .0029113
(.0089845) (.0115869) (.0115481) (.0126662)
Father’s education
-.0040971 .0014876 .0227115∗∗ .0123596
(.0066316) (.0087721) (.0112107) (.0123914)
Black
-.1594923∗∗∗ -.2433696∗∗∗ .0882053 .0680362
(.0498651) (.0687275) (.0740262) (.0807415)
Hispanic
-.0436163 .0189614 .1135161 .1262783
(.0547214) (.0736877) (.0739255) (.0815494)
Female
-.0975346∗∗ -.2570386∗∗∗ -.1467682∗∗∗ -.2547798∗∗∗
(.0398873) (.0481688) (.0545605) (.0579082)
Constant
-2.07053∗∗∗ -1.998738∗∗∗ -2.918532∗∗∗ -2.312771∗∗∗
(.1995637) (.1689988) (.4212323) (.3066065)
n 103,287 5,779 30,524 4,264
Table 1.6: Marginal effects on entry into incorporated self-employment. Standard errors
clustered at the individual level (columns 1 and 3) or robust (columns 2 and 4). In columns
1 and 3, the dependent variable is entrepreneurship status in a given year, and in columns
2 and 4 it is having ever been an entrepreneur across all years for which data is available.
“AFQT” denotes the natural log of AFQT scores, and “Risk tolerance” denotes the natural
log of risk tolerance values. The lowest value of each variable is 0. The cut-off for low vs
high risk tolerance is 5 based on the original measurement. Columns 1 and 3 additionally
control for the person’s industry in a given year, although those results are not reported.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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The second set of estimates is closer to what we have modeled. The model does not
say when a person would become an entrepreneur or for how long they would run their
business, only that some individuals are more likely to pursue this career at some point
than are others. I thus label as an entrepreneur each person who is an incorporated
business owner at any point during the measured time period and estimate the model at
the individual level. For these regressions standard errors are estimated robustly, allowing
for potential heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation.
The following control variables are also included in the model: income earned the previous
year in thousands of 2010 dollars, the family income when the respondent was a child in
thousands of 2010 dollars, whether the respondent grew up in a two-parent household, the
mother’s and father’s education, dummies for race and sex, and the industry in which the
individual works. The variables that change over time are dropped from the person-level
regressions.
We see that on average, ability has a positive direct impact on the probability of en-
trepreneurship, and that its impact tends to be higher at higher levels of risk tolerance.
In the NLSY97 sample using person-year observations, the point estimate on ability is
negative at both high and low levels of risk tolerance, although the coefficients are not
significant. The marginal effect of risk tolerance is larger and positive in every specifica-
tion, and is statistically significant in three of the four regressions. This is consistent with
risk tolerance having a greater impact on whether an individual becomes an entrepreneur
than does the person’s cognitive ability.
In both samples, income earned the previous year has a statistically significant positive
effect on entry. It is those who earn more who tend to become incorporated business
owners. Prior entrepreneurship status predicts current entrepreneurship status well. This
is not surprising, considering that most individuals are never entrepreneurs.
Being female makes one much less likely to be an incorporated entrepreneur in either co-
hort. Women do tend to be more risk averse in both samples, but this is an additional
impact after controlling for risk preferences. This female gap in entrepreneurship partic-
ipation is large, and is highly statistically significant in all specifications. At the average
value of all other regressors, the probability of entrepreneurship is lower for a woman by
3.5 to 3.8 percentage points as compared to a man. This is huge, considering that the
maximum predicted probability of entrepreneurship for any individual in either sample is
35%.
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In one regression, having a more highly educated father is associated with higher prob-
ability of entrepreneurship, but this effect is not replicated in the other specifications.
Growing up in a two-parent household also produces a negative, marginally significant
coefficient in one specification, but in this case all regressions document a small negative
effect.
Interestingly, while a higher mother’s level of education is associated with greater pursuit
of entrepreneurship in the NLSY79, this is not the case for the younger cohort. It is
possible that educated women became more prevalent by the time the 1997 cohort was
born, but that it made the family unusual in some way for the 1979 cohort.
Another potentially encouraging observation is that while a higher family income during
the respondent’s childhood is positively associated with entry into entrepreneurship in the
NLSY79, it is no longer significant in the NLSY97. In addition, while being black is neg-
atively and significantly associated with entrepreneurship in the NLSY79, the coefficient
estimates are positive, although not significant, in the NLSY97.
1.5.3 Counterfactuals
For the counterfactual analysis, I focus on the person-level models, the estimates for which
are reported in columns 2 and 4 of Table 1.6. The reported regression estimates can be
thought of as describing a surface above a multi-dimensional support. This is the predicted
probability of entrepreneurship at each combination of independent variable values. I am
interested to see how this surface varies across the support defined by only two of the
variables, risk tolerance and ability. This means I need to set the values of all other
variables to some constants. The natural choice is the average value of each variable in
the sample used in estimation. The resulting object is then a normal CDF-shaped surface
above the ln θ-ln γ plane, gradually increasing as β1 ln θ + β2 ln γ increases
8. Choosing
a different set of constants for the control variables is analogous to shifting this CDF
“backwards” or “forwards” relative to its contour lines, bringing high probability values
closer to or further from the origin.
In order to perform calculations based on the estimated surface, I discretize the ln θ-ln γ
space, separating it into bins as in Figure 1.3. I then take the predicted probability of
entrepreneurship at the middle values of each bin and apply this value for the whole bin.
8Technically, the estimated specification defines two different CDFs, one of which is defined on low
levels of γ and the other of which is defined on high levels of γ.
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The surface described above is a point estimate, a Φ(yˆ), where yˆ depends on the estimated
values of the β parameters. I calculate the variance of yˆ in each (ln θ, ln γ) bin by pre- and
post-multiplying the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the βˆ by a vector of regressor
values. I keep the value of the control variables set to their in-sample average value and
I change the values of ln θ and ln γ as appropriate for each bin. I then take the square
root of the variance to get a standard error and form a confidence interval around each yˆ
by adding/subtracting 1.96 times the standard error. Transforming the resulting yˆs using
the normal CDF then produces error bands for the surface.
For each combination of risk tolerance and ability, we now have a prediction for how
likely an individual with those characteristics is to become an entrepreneur. Within each
bin, we expect to observe n · p entrepreneurs, where n is the number of people whose
values of ability and risk tolerance fall into that bin, and p is the predicted probability
of entrepreneurship for the bin. Summing the expected number of entrepreneurs across
all bins in the sample gives us the total predicted number of entrepreneurs. We can get
error bands on this number by performing the calculation using the error bands on the
probability of entrepreneurship.
The actual number of individuals who are at any point observed to be entrepreneurs is
843 in the NLSY79 and 663 in the NLSY97. The model predicts 632.19 entrepreneurs
in the NLSY79 with a confidence interval of (-99.78, 1364.16). In the NLSY97, the total
predicted number is 485.01 with a confidence interval of (-273.22, 1243.24). These values
underpredict, but this is likely because the values chosen for the control variables bias
the prediction downward deterministically. In all cases considered, the model predicts
approximately 75% of the actual number of entrepreneurs. We can thus still use the
predictions to gain insight about relative changes under various counterfactual scenarios.
Gender gap in entrepreneurship
There is a notable gap in the number of male and female entrepreneurs in the data. In
the NLSY79, the gender breakdown of entrepreneurs is 310 women and 533 men. In the
NLSY97, the numbers are 237 and 426. In both cases, approximately 36% of entrepreneurs
are women. There is evidence in the literature that women are more risk averse (for
example, Borghans et al., 2009, Agnew et al., 2008), so that could be the reason for the
difference. Figure 1.8 shows that women and men do differ in their risk tolerance as
well as cognitive ability in the NLSY cohorts. Men are relatively more likely to obtain a
very low or very high score on the AFQT, and men are also relatively more likely to be
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highly risk tolerant. Perhaps it is this relative over-representation in the right tail of both
distributions that leads men to become entrepreneurs more frequently. Maybe women are
just less willing to take the necessary risks.
(a) AFQT, NLSY79 (b) AFQT, NLSY97
(c) Risk tolerance, NLSY79 (d) Risk tolerance, NLSY97
Figure 1.8: Distribution of ability and risk tolerance by sex
That explanation seems improbable. In both model specifications estimated, the coefficient
on the female dummy is negative and highly statistically significant. This shows that even
controlling for differences in ability and risk tolerance, women are still at a disadvantage
when it comes to pursuing entrepreneurship. The source of this “handicap” is important
to investigate in future research. It could be due to cultural norms or greater difficulty
obtaining funding or perhaps other factors. Here, I calculate the extent to which it inhibits
entrepreneurship among women, and to what extent it is women’s risk tolerance or ability
that prevent them from becoming entrepreneurs.
So far, the surface we have used to calculate the number of entrepreneurs is based on setting
the value of the female dummy to the average in the sample. There are approximately
the same number of men and women in either NLSY cohort, so this value is roughly 0.5.
As discussed at the beginning of this section, changing the value of the control variables
shifts the probability distribution. For men, changing the dummy to 0 pulls the surface
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closer to the origin relative to the surface used thus far. For women, setting it to 1 pushes
the surface further away from the origin. This has the effect of raising the probability of
entrepreneurship in every bin for men, and lowering it for women. We can thus consider
two scenarios. How many more female entrepreneurs would we expect to observe if there
were no “woman handicap” and both men’s and women’s probabilities of entrepreneurship
were determined by the men’s surface? Alternatively, if we keep the surface fixed for both
genders, to what extent does the model predict a gender gap in entrepreneurship, and how
does it change if women’s characteristics are reweighed to match those of men?
First I look at the number of male and female entrepreneurs the model predicts if we set
the female dummy to 0 and 1, respectively, shifting the surface accordingly for each gender.
In the NLSY79, the model predicts 249.71 (CI -179.04, 678.46) female entrepreneurs and
399.40 (CI 11.00, 787.80) male entrepreneurs. In the NLSY97, it is 182.27 (CI -257.00,
621.53) female entrepreneurs and 314.19 (CI -90.61, 718.99) male entrepreneurs. The
fraction of predicted entrepreneurs who are women closely matches the true value, 38% in
the NLSY79 and 37% in the NLSY97.
Reweighing the women’s joint distribution of risk tolerance and ability to match that of
men while keeping the “handicap” in place brings the number of female entrepreneurs
up, but only slightly. The new predicted numbers are 266.21 (CI -164.09, 696.51) in the
NLSY79 and 195.97 (CI -237.16, 629.11) in the NLSY97. Accounting for women’s differing
ability and risk preferences relative to men thus brings the fraction of female entrepreneurs
up to 40% and 38%, respectively.
The change is more drastic if we remove the gender bias while keeping women’s risk
preferences and ability as they actually are distributed. In this case, both men’s and
women’s probability of entrepreneurship is determined by the men’s surface. Now, the
model predicts 398.67 (CI -12.96, 810.31) female entrepreneurs in the NLSY79 and 292.35
(CI -117.79, 702.48) female entrepreneurs in the NLSY97. If we additionally reweigh
women’s risk preferences and ability to match those of men, we get 422.33 (CI 11.63,
833.02) and 312.17 (CI -90.03, 714.36) female entrepreneurs in each cohort.
This last case amounts to parity, the number of female entrepreneurs we would expect to
see if risk preferences and ability were the same for men and women, and if there were
no other bias preventing women from becoming entrepreneurs. The fraction of women
who become entrepreneurs is then equal to the fraction of men who become entrepreneurs.
Allowing for gender differences in ability and risk tolerance decreases the number of female
entrepreneurs by 5.6% and 6.3% in the NLSY79 and NLSY97, respectively. Allowing for
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the “woman handicap” decreases it by a further 35.3% in both cohorts. Differences in
risk preferences or ability thus explain approximately 13.7%-15.3% of the gender gap in
entrepreneurship.
Lowering risk for high ability
As noted previously, high cognitive ability is associated with middling levels of risk tol-
erance. At the same time, the marginal effect of greater risk tolerance on entry into
entrepreneurship is relatively high, and the marginal effect of ability is higher when risk
tolerance is high. It is thus interesting to consider the impact a risk-lowering intervention
may have on those with high cognitive skill. This is essentially the service that some
business incubators offer to potential start-up founders.
The number of entrepreneurs in the NLSY79 and NLSY97 whose AFQT score is 70 or
higher is 215 and 151, respectively. Using the model with average values of all control
variables, the predicted number of such high-ability entrepreneurs is 132.07 (CI -18.87,
283.00) in the NLSY79 and 131.62 (CI -51.59, 314.84) in the NLSY97.
I consider an intervention which lowers the risk involved in running an incorporated busi-
ness by an amount equivalent to shifting individuals up one level of risk tolerance, keeping
all else constant. The new predicted number of highly able entrepreneurs is 142.85 (CI
-2.41, 288.12) in the NLSY79 and 145.82 (CI -29.74, 321.38) in the NLSY97. The first is
equivalent to an 8.16% increase, and the second is a 10.79% increase. In practice, we would
need to determine the appropriate measures which lower the risks involved, but lowering
this barrier to entry could potentially encourage substantial entry into entrepreneurship
among high-ability individuals.
1.6 Conclusion
Governments around the world are keen to encourage entrepreneurship, seeing it as a key
source of innovation and of economic growth. As always, it comes down to individual choice
– who will respond to government incentives? What kind of businesses would they start?
Are different incentives necessary to encourage the would-be founders of an ambitious,
transformative start-up as compared to a local small family business? Based on past
research and the NLSY data, it appears personal characteristics of potential entrepreneurs
play a nontrivial role in determining who decides to start a business and who prefers
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the comfort of a stable job with an employer. In particular, if it is the formation of
innovative technological companies that a government would like to stimulate, the pool
of potential founders must be composed of individuals with a great deal of technical
knowledge and intellectual ability. At the same time, entrepreneurship of any kind is
an uncertain endeavour that requires a sufficient tolerance for risk. The combination
of both characteristics in one person is rare. Through taking steps to lower the risk
associated with founding one’s own company, it may be possible to nudge a greater number
of high ability individuals into entrepreneurship, potentially leading to greater innovation
and commercialization of the new technologies. There is evidence that it is possible to
induce people to engage in innovation (Zivin and Lyons, 2018), so it is likely incorporated
entrepreneurship can also be induced by targeting those frictions which inhibit it.
Another longer-term strategy to encourage greater innovation and entrepreneurship is to
invest in people – after all, individuals’ personal traits may either help or hinder their
probability of becoming an entrepreneur. While it is relatively rare to find an adult who
is both highly intelligent as well as sufficiently risk tolerant, this does not have to be true
for the next generation. Children are in the process of developing both their cognitive
and noncognitive abilities throughout their childhood. As has been previously shown by
Heckman and Masterov (2007), if governments insufficiently invest in the development of
young children growing up in disadvantaged environments, they miss out on an investment
with high economic and social returns. Perhaps one of these returns is a greater number
of entrepreneurs. Bell et al. (2019) have found that exposure to innovation increases
children’s propensity to innovate themselves as adults. Being allowed to develop a healthy
attitude towards risk as well as their cognitive abilities may do the same for children’s
future entrepreneurial careers. In both waves of the NLSY, a lower family income in
childhood is associated with lower performance on the AFQT. Its impact on risk tolerance
is dual – those who grow up with fewer resources appear to either become very risk averse
or very risk tolerant. Investing in underprivileged children may thus change the joint
distribution of the two characteristics compared to what is currently observed in adults,
and lead to both greater innovation and entrepreneurship in society.
Exploring the potential for inducing a greater number of individuals to become entrepreneurs
is left for future research, together with other important considerations, such as how the
performance of these marginal individuals would differ from that of those who would enter
anyway, and whether the welfare trade-offs are worthwhile. A randomized controlled trial
could go a long way towards answering these policy-relevant questions. If highly intelli-
gent people are capable of developing a new technology and bringing it to market, but the
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perceived riskiness of attempting to do this prevents them from acting, then lowering that
barrier can be an effective way to encourage the formation of such companies. However, it
is also possible that those who do not start a business choose to do so because they know
they cannot build a company, in which case convincing them otherwise will not be effective
at producing greater innovation. This is a difficult assessment for an individual to make
– after all, many factors can influence whether a company succeeds or fails. It is much
easier to determine whether a person has the underlying technical knowledge necessary
to try. Through differentiated recruitment messaging that emphasizes low or high levels
of risk involved (e.g. “80% of our founders found the experience worthwhile” vs. “1% of
our founders have sold their company for more than £1 million”), a business incubator
could determine whether marginal individuals are self-selecting efficiently. If they are not,
lowering the relevant barrier may result in greater innovation, growth, and potentially
higher welfare.
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Chapter 2
Nonlinearities in 2SLS
2.1 Introduction
Mullainathan and Spiess (2017) point out that the first stage of the two stage least squares
method is effectively a prediction task as opposed to an exercise in parameter estimation.
The marginal effects we estimate are only a means to an end, a way to form a prediction
Xˆ, which we then use in the second stage to estimate the parameters that are of interest to
us. We often ignore the complexities of the process generating the first stage relationship
and model it linearly, relying on the many results that assure us this is a robust method.
However, if the true relationship is not linear, Newey (1990) shows that it is possible to
improve the efficiency of our parameter estimates by changing how we estimate the first
stage – the authors emphasize this is where machine learning methods can be helpful.
In this paper, we evaluate the extent to which second stage estimates improve under
several different nonlinear first stage data generating processes (DGPs). We find that
the greatest gain in both efficiency and bias of the estimates occurs when the nonlinear
DGP has an average slope close to 0 over the input domain. In this case, the instrument
typically appears weak to the linear method, and as expected, it performs poorly, whereas a
nonlinear approach is able to discern the true first stage relationship and produces accurate
second stage parameter estimates. Alternatively, the instrument may appear strong when
estimated on the drawn data sample – but it incorrectly identifies the underlying DGP
and results in poor second stage estimates, potentially leading to mistaken inference.
The method we apply to estimate a nonlinear first stage is neural networks. This allows
us to remain agnostic with regards to the shape of the relationship, but to ensure that we
47
allow enough flexibility to trace out any potential DGP. Unlike most papers which develop
and analyze nonlinear instrumental variables methods (e.g. Newey et al., 1999; Horowitz,
2011), the second stage remains linear, as this is the most intuitive relationship commonly
used in applied work. Without complicating the analysis of the question of interest, there
is an advantage to more carefully considering the nature of the first stage.
It is important to emphasize that the set-up we propose is not, in fact, a “forbidden regres-
sion” (Hausman, 1975). That may have been so were we to use the predicted values as a
regressor in the second stage (i.e. βˆ = (Xˆ ′Xˆ)−1Xˆ ′Y ). Instead, we use the predicted values
as an instrument in the second stage, circumventing that problem (i.e. βˆ = (Xˆ ′X)−1Xˆ ′Y ).
While both expressions are equivalent when the first stage is estimated by ordinary least
squares, the values differ when a nonlinear relationship is estimated, and only the latter
expression remains a consistent estimator for β (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
Recent work highlights the weakness of some conclusions based on two stage least squares
estimation when used in practice. For example, Young (2019) points out that, “In pub-
lished papers, statistically significant IV results generally depend upon only one or two
observations or clusters, excluded instruments often appear to be irrelevant, there is little
statistical evidence that OLS is biased, and IV confidence intervals almost always include
OLS point estimates.” Dieterle and Snell (2014) also explore the sensitivity of model pa-
rameter estimates to changes in the first stage specification by allowing for the possibility
of a quadratic relationship between instrument and endogenous regressor, as compared
to constraining the relationship to a linear one. They observe that, “Across the fifteen
papers [they] study here, [they] find evidence of significant nonlinearities in ten papers.
Six of these ten studies have cases where the significant quadratic first stage is associated
with a statistically significant difference in the 2SLS estimates of interest.”
Based on the results we present in this paper, we do not find the above surprising. In
particular, we show that if the true relationship in the first stage is quadratic, it is possible
to draw a sample in which a linear first stage appears statistically significant, but which
then produces a model parameter estimate that lies on the opposite side of the OLS
estimate than does the true value, leading to incorrect inference. We also see that two
stage least squares can be very sensitive to the sample drawn and can produce wide
confidence intervals, as well as point estimates that are further from the truth than is
the OLS. While not a panacea, the neural network based approach results in a smaller
variance of the resulting estimator, which typically leads to a smaller mean squared error
in parameter estimates. Overall we observe little harm from allowing for nonlinearity in
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estimating the first stage, and much advantage.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses nonlinear estimation
methods and introduces neural networks. Sections 3 and 4 describe our simulation set-up
and estimation process, respectively. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 discusses
extensions. Section 7 concludes.
2.2 Background
To some extent, the choice to use neural networks is an arbitrary one. Our main intent
is to allow for potential nonlinearities in the first stage and then to calculate the impact
on the estimates of interest in the second stage. This is not the first paper to suggest
nonlinear IV. The theory has been developed previously (e.g. Newey et al., 1999; Newey
and Powell, 2003; Blundell et al., 2007; Horowitz, 2011; Chen and Pouzo, 2012). Neither
is this the first paper to suggest the use of neural networks in IV estimation – this has
been done by Hartford et al. (2017).
The papers mentioned above focus on expanding the toolbox available to researchers and
on describing the properties of the tools which they develop. Our aim is to bridge the
gap between theory and applied work by providing an intuitive practical guideline for the
extent to which estimates can suffer when we ignore potential nonlinearity in practice.
We also identify situations where inference based on a linear method leads to a confident
but incorrect conclusion. In applied work, we would encourage the estimation of the first
stage both linearly and nonlinearly, to compare the resulting second stage estimates. If
the two differ significantly, it is likely nonlinearity is present. Estimating the first stage
using a neural network is a convenient way to allow for nonlinearity, and it appears to
reasonably estimate a wide range of functional forms within a finite sample. Further
work is necessary to fully establish the differences in finite sample performance of different
nonlinear modeling methods, but we provide some indication below.
2.2.1 Flexibility of nonlinear models
When choosing a nonlinear modeling method, there are two aspects to consider. The first
is flexibility – what class of functions can the method approximate well? This typically
means choosing an appropriate set of basis functions, a linear combination of which then
approximates the function being modeled. For instance, using a polynomial basis amounts
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to estimating the Taylor expansion of the DGP over the support. Each additional term
adds a further degree of flexibility, as the degree of the polynomial determines the maximal
number of turns the polynomial can take.
If the researcher a priori knows that the DGP is periodic, using polynomials is not a good
choice, as a polynomial approaches positive or negative infinity in the limit. Instead of a
Taylor expansion, a Fourier series expansion may be more appropriate, where the basis
functions are sinusoidal. Numerous other potential basis functions are possible and have
been proposed, such as wavelets, splines, or Hermite polynomials. In a neural network
with a single input and a single hidden layer, the basis functions are sigmoids1, each of
which can be linearly stretched or shifted.
Each additional node in a single hidden layer neural network corresponds to adding an
α1 ·σ(α2+α3x) term, where the x is the input (observation), σ(·) is the activation function,
and the αs are parameters to be estimated. A bias (constant) term is also included. Adding
further layers complicates the basis function reasoning, as each additional layer treats the
output from the previous layer as inputs. This means that we end up with activation
functions applied to activation functions, resulting in greater complexity.
All the methods discussed so far are universal approximators. In the limit, they can
approximate any continuous function. In theory, it does not matter which basis we choose.
As the number of terms included goes to infinity, any method will trace out any function
to any preset level of precision. In practice, we use a finite number of terms, and it is
easier to interpret a terser representation than one with numerous terms. For instance,
it is easier to understand sin(x) than a summation of polynomials. The “correct” choice
of basis functions – one that will approximate the DGP using the fewest terms – depends
on foreknowledge of the specific DGP. Even if we choose the “correct” basis, we still need
to ensure we include enough terms. The excluded terms are restricted to have a weight
of 0, which may preclude reaching the desired level of precision in the approximation. An
advantage of neural networks is that they make it easy to add a lot of complexity very
quickly, especially with the addition of each new layer. As such, one is unlikely to specify
insufficient model flexibility. This is useful, as in practice we do not know the true shape
of the DGP we aim to estimate. On the other hand, interpreting the resulting function
may be difficult, so this approach has mainly been used when the focus is on creating a
prediction rather than understanding the underlying process.
1The basis function is whichever activation function is chosen. Typical choices given the estimation
technique used include sigmoids or the rectifier.
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2.2.2 Estimation of nonlinear models
The second aspect to consider when choosing a nonlinear modeling method is estimation.
Some unknown values of the parameters in the model will bring us closest to the true
DGP function. We can estimate the same model using standard OLS, a regularized ver-
sion such as LASSO, maximum likelihood methods, or, in the case of neural networks,
stochastic gradient descent (Robbins and Monro, 1951; Bottou, 2010). Each approach
will in practice produce different estimates for each parameter, and even the same method
may be computed slightly differently by different software or by using different numerical
approaches. A further complication is that the sampled values from the DGP that we
have available may be noisy measures, and we may not have very many measurements.
The closed-form solution for parameter estimates given by OLS may be most familiar,
but all of the estimation methods described above are based on the minimization of a
loss function. (For maximum likelihood, we can minimize the negative of the likelihood
function.) Typically, the loss function is the sum of squared residuals, as it is in OLS, but
it can take other forms, such as the sum of the absolute values of the residuals. The design
of loss functions is its own area of research (e.g. Masnadi-shirazi and Vasconcelos, 2008).
Regularizing terms are added to the loss function with a weight, pushing the loss upwards
when parameter values are set to nonzero values, forcing a cost-benefit trade-off on the
estimation. Calculating the derivatives with respect to each parameter and then solving
the resulting system of equations is not always possible2, either analytically or because
computing the values directly is very costly, so approximations become necessary.
Stochastic gradient descent is one such approach. The basic idea is to take “steps” through
the space spanned by the parameters until the steps taken by the algorithm no longer
decrease the value of the loss function. The algorithm is initialized at a random point – a
random value for each parameter – and evaluates the gradient at that point with respect to
each parameter. A random subset of parameters is then chosen and the average gradient
across that subset is calculated. This determines the direction in which the algorithm will
step. The initial size of the step must be specified, but after that it is possible to adjust
it dynamically. After taking the step, the parameters are set to their new values and
the new value of the loss function is evaluated. The algorithm continues until the value
of the loss function no longer decreases sufficiently with each new step, at which point
it concludes that the minimum value has been reached. Bishop (2006) contains a more
2Recent work by Dyer and Gur-Ari (2019) has shown that it is possible to calculate a closed-form
solution for some terms that govern neural network training, but this is currently not standard practice.
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detailed discussion.
When estimating impacts in an instrumental variables framework, the second-stage co-
efficients will be affected if the first stage Xˆ predictions change. Constraining the first
stage relationship to be linear limits the precision with which it is possible to approximate
the true relationship. The further the true DGP is from linearity, the more constraining
is this bound. Even a perfect estimate of the coefficients of a linear first stage model
will then mispredict the way in which X varies with Z, the instrument. This, in turn,
will affect the inference of how Y is affected by changes in X. At best, it will make the
estimate less precise; at worst, it will lead to erroneous conclusions about the nature of
that relationship.
Neural networks provide an easy way for a researcher to maximize their agnosticism.
Allowing a great deal of flexibility ensures that the relationship between X and Z can
potentially be estimated with great precision. If the neural network overfits and estimates
not only the variation in X due to Z but also the variation due to unmodeled noise, this
would bring the second stage estimates towards the OLS estimates, as Xˆ would be nearly
the same as X. So long as the overfitting is not biased across the support, for example
due to heteroskedasticity, we should be in no danger of “inventing” a relationship that is
not truly there.
2.2.3 Comparing neural network with LASSO
To evaluate how well a neural network estimates a nonlinear DGP compared to a more
standard approach, we compare its finite sample performance to LASSO. A typical starting
point if one suspects nonlinearity is present in the relationship between two variables y
and x is to add powers of x to the model, a polynomial basis. Regularization then “weeds
out” the irrelevant powers of x during estimation by setting the weight on those terms to
0.
Because we intend to utilize relatively simple DGPs in the simulation, we set up a rel-
atively small neural network with a single hidden layer of 5 nodes. We keep the same
configuration for the simulations reported later in the paper in order to keep all results
comparable. While it is possible to quickly scale the complexity, we merely wanted to
introduce the possibility of nonlinearity into the estimation, so we erred on the side of too
little flexibility. In typical applications, neural networks will be set up with hundreds of
nodes and numerous hidden layers.
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With a single hidden layer, each node is associated with 3 free parameters, plus the model
allows for a bias, so the total number of parameters in the model set up is 16. We
use the hyperbolic tangent activation function and estimate the model using stochastic
gradient descent. Both of these are common choices, although other options are available.
The estimation method and activation function are typically chosen based on resulting
performance. In our case, the intention was to keep results comparable using some default
settings across a variety of scenarios, so we did not try to improve on this combination.
The estimation method includes regularization, so not all parameters may end up being
used. To keep the comparison fair, we include a constant and fifteen powers of x in the
LASSO estimation.
In each case, we aim to estimate f(x), where y = f(x) + . We compare how closely the
predicted values of yˆ match the true relationship between y and x by comparing the mean
squared error of each set of estimates, that is, (1/n)
∑n
i=1(f(xi) − yˆi)2. Here, n is the
sample size, which we set to n = 10, 000. We also consider two possible f(·) functions, x2
and cosx – in the first case, the “correct” basis has been chosen for the LASSO, and in
the second case, it is “incorrect”. Both x and  are assumed to be repeated i.i.d. draws
from two different zero-mean normal distributions. The variance of x is set to 15. This
means we expect to observe values of f(x) approximately between 0 and 135 under the
first DGP and between -1 and 1 in the second DGP. We set the variance of  to either be
low, about 20% of the difference between max and min f(x), or high, about 70% of the
difference. In the first case the corresponding values are 27 and 94.5, and in the second
case it is .4 and 1.4.
In the quadratic case, where we chose the “correct” basis, LASSO unambiguously out-
performs the neural network. Its MSE is 813.55 and 916.51 in the low and high noise
case, respectively. The corresponding values for the neural network are 578491.99 and
1052041.37. In this case it appears that the neural network we set up was too small and
ran out of flexibility, as it does not fit well in the sparser parts of the support, where x is
largest3.
In the cosine case, however, the neural network performs better. It does still appear to
run out of degrees of freedom and is not able to fit well at the edges of the support as data
becomes sparser. Overall, however, it still performs much better than the LASSO, which
appears not able to fully make use of the flexibility it has. In the low noise case, the MSE
for LASSO is 4270.71 and 970.18 for the neural net. In the high noise case, the values are
3Changing the activation function to the rectifier or adding a greater number of nodes to the hidden
layer does improve the fit.
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4271.73 and 1153.58.
Figure 2.1 shows the true relationship and both predictions for each DGP in the low noise
case. Even with a small single hidden layer, a neural network appears better able to
conform to a variety of shapes. Its estimation process may be more efficient at finding the
best set of parameters as compared to the LASSO.
Figure 2.1: LASSO vs NN performance in the low noise case (noise not shown)
2.3 Simulating data
To determine the relative performance of the neural network (NN) approach compared to
standard two stage least squares (2SLS), we set up a data generating process to create
synthetic data. For each experiment, we repeatedly generate data samples using the
DGP, as we would if we could repeatedly draw samples from a population for analysis.
This allows us to empirically trace out the “true” distribution of parameter estimates
for a sample of a given size, from which we usually observe only one draw in real-world
applications.
2.3.1 Basic set-up
The process used to generate the data is the following:
Model: Y = Xβ + 
First stage: X = f(Z, γ) + ν
(2.1)
Table 2.1 details all the versions of the f(·) function considered. The aim is to estimate the
value of β as closely and accurately as possible in each case. X is endogenous because the
error terms in the model and first stage are set such that Cov(, ν) 6= 0. The f(·) function
values are generated independently of the error terms. We report the OLS estimates,
which show the bias that results from the endogeneity, and the βˆ estimates resulting from
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Model
yi = β0 + β1xi + i
First stage DGPs
xi = f(zi, γ) + νi
Linear xi = γ0 + γ1zi + νi
Logistic cdf xi = 200
(
1
1 + exp(−(γ0+γ1zi)0.15 )
)
+ νi
Quadratic xi = (γ0 + γ1zi)
2 + νi
Sinusoid xi = 90 cos(0.2(γ0 + γ1zi)) + νi
Sinusoid2 xi = 90 sin(0.2(γ0 + γ1zi)) + νi
Probit xi =
{
1 x∗i = f(zi, γ) + νi > 0
0 x∗i = f(zi, γ) + νi ≤ 0
f(zi, γ) takes on the same functional forms as above, except
the logistic and quadratic are shifted downwards by 100 and by
the value of σν , respectively. νi ∼ N(0, σ2ν)
Unless otherwise noted, the following parameter values are used:
β0 = 12, β1 = 1, γ0 = 0, γ1 = −3, σz =
√
10, σ = 40, σν = 200, ρ = −0.8
Table 2.1: Functional forms used to generate different kinds of nonlinear relationships
between the instrument and endogenous regressor.
estimating the first stage relationship either using the standard linear method or a neural
network.
The baseline case is linear, where f(Z, γ) is simply Zγ. Z contains any exogenous re-
gressors from the model and the instrument, and γ are the associated parameters. For
every version of first stage DGP considered, any exogenous X variables and instrument
are drawn from a joint normal distribution centered at the origin, with the covariance
matrix chosen in such a way as to ensure a bias resulting from endogeneity is present and
sufficiently large. The two error terms,  and ν, are drawn from a different joint normal
distribution to ensure independence, so that in expectation neither is correlated with the
exogenous variables. We set the correlation ρ between  and ν as well as the corresponding
standard deviations, σ and σν , which determines the covariance of the joint normal mean
0 distribution. Once the exogenous variable data has been generated, the endogenous
variables yi and xi are formed as shown in equation 2.1 using a specific choice of f(·).
2.3.2 Generating bias
To elaborate further on the choice of parameter values for the simulation, recall the source
of the bias in the OLS estimates. Consider the simplest linear model with a single endoge-
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nous regressor xi and corresponding instrument zi:
yi = β0 + β1xi + i, where
xi = γ0 + γ1zi + νi and Cov(νi, i) 6= 0
(2.2)
The object that βˆ1,OLS estimates will be
Cov(xi,yi)
Var(xi)
. This is the true value of β1 plus
Cov(xi,i)
Var(xi)
. Plugging in the expression for xi, we can write the bias in βˆ1 in terms of
parameters and exogenous variables as the following:
bias =
ρσσν
γ21σ
2
z + σ
2
ν
(2.3)
All of the values in the above expression are parameters of the simulated DGP that we can
set to ensure a non-zero bias. As the model becomes more complex, the exact expression
for the bias becomes more difficult to work out. However, it can be shown that when
there is one additional exogenous variable, the bias term of the parameter estimate on the
endogenous variable becomes the following, where it is again possible to set all the values:
bias =
σ2x1ρσσν
σ2x1(γ
2
0 + γ
2
1σ
2
x1 + γ
2
2σ
2
w + 2γ1γ2σx1,w + σ
2
ν)− (γ1σ2x1 + γ2σx1,w)2
(2.4)
In the above, x1 is the additional exogenous variable, x2 is the endogenous variable which is
modeled linearly as γ0+γ1x1+γ2w, and w is the instrument. σx1,w represents Cov(x1i, wi),
and the σ2 terms represent variances.
In his paper, Young (2019) notes that there is little statistical evidence of bias in OLS
estimates. We found that in setting parameter values, it is easier to generate smaller
sizes of bias, as the parameters counteract each other’s effects or simply drive the bias
towards zero. An interesting question to consider in future research is what fraction of the
parameter space actually generates a large enough bias to be statistically detectable or
economically relevant, and in which cases the bias is most likely to be observed in practice.
2.4 Estimation
Once we have generated the data, we proceed to estimate the parameters of interest (β)
using the 2SLS and NN approaches. Each experiment consists of 2000 samples drawn from
the population DGP and analyzed. For a single iteration of an experiment, we draw a
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data sample of a pre-specified size and then construct βˆ2SLS and βˆNN , our two estimates
of β. (We also calculate βˆOLS as a benchmark.) The second stage is estimated identically
in both cases, using the predicted values of the endogenous variable as instruments: βˆj =
(Xˆ ′jX)
−1(Xˆ ′jY ), j ∈ {2SLS, NN}. Only the estimation of the first stage differs.
For βˆ2SLS , the first stage is calculated in the usual way, linearly using OLS by regressing
the endogenous regressor on any exogenous regressors and the instrument. Xˆ2SLS is then
simply ZγˆOLS .
We estimate the XˆNN in MATLAB, using the Deep Learning Toolbox. The input to
the neural network is Z, the matrix of observations of any exogenous regressors plus
instrument, and the corresponding targets are the vector of values of the endogenous
variable. We use a single hidden layer, with Bayesian regularization backpropagation as
the estimation algorithm. The size of the hidden layer can be easily adjusted to allow for
a more or less complex model; unless otherwise noted, we set the size of the hidden layer
to 5 for all experiments.
In our experiments, one iteration thus produces one βˆ2SLS and one βˆNN . We can see how
these vary for a given sample size when we draw multiple data samples from the population;
a histogram shows the distribution of each estimator across all 2000 iterations. The true
variance of each βˆ is then estimated using the variance of this empirical distribution.
2.5 Results
Standard 2SLS is a robust method, and generally performs well, so long as there is an
overall slope in the first stage for it to uncover. Even so, the neural network approach
typically produces an estimator with a lower mean squared error. That is, although it can
in some cases be slightly more biased in the finite sample than 2SLS, this is more than
compensated for by the reduction in the variance of the parameter estimates. In certain
cases, estimating the first stage nonlinearly results in both less bias as well as a lower
variance.
An instrument may appear weak when it is not – the linear estimate has a slope close
to 0, but a strong nonlinear relationship exists4. That is usually relatively harmless and
necessitates looking for a different instrument, if using standard 2SLS. However, it is also
4We know that here because we generate the data based on a specific nonlinear relationship. Deter-
mining whether this is true in an arbitrary dataset is more difficult and the issue is discussed further in
section 2.6.
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possible that in the linearly estimated first stage, the instrument appears to be statistically
significant, but this significance is the consequence of drawing a sample in which there is an
overall slope, not a result of approximating the DGP correctly. In this case, the erroneous
linear estimate of the DGP is not simply an oversimplification of the process, but it is an
incorrect estimate of the average slope. This results in misleading estimates of βˆ, which
can yield incorrect qualitative conclusions, i.e. that OLS over- rather than under-estimates
the true effect.
For an instrumental variables approach to work, it must be the case that there be a
relationship between the instrument(s) and the endogenous regressor, the stronger, the
better. This is usually verified using an F statistic from the first stage regression (although,
as described above, this can be misleading). Importantly, what is actually needed is a
strong relationship between the instrument and the exogenous portion of the endogenous
regressor, as the aim is not to match x using z as closely as possible, but to extract the
relevant signal from the endogenous noise; in other words, to find the relevant f(Z, γ).
Failure to disentangle the signal from the noise biases an instrumental variable estimate
towards the OLS estimate (Mullainathan and Spiess, 2017).
Correspondingly, in the tables and figures below, we report MSE(f), a modification of
the standard sum of squared residuals measure. This measures how closely each approach
predicts the exogenous portion of the endogenous variable. More concretely, for a single
experiment MSE(f) =
∑n
i=1(Xˆi − fi)2/n, where n is the sample size, and the reported
measure MSE(f) is the average across all experiments. The lower this measure, the
closer are the estimated values to the true relationship between x and z. Certainly this
is not possible to observe when one does not know the true DGP, but seeing the relative
performance of a linear versus nonlinear first stage fit in our experiments provides a useful
benchmark.
2.5.1 Continuous endogenous variable
Model: yi = β0 + β1xi + i
First stage: xi = f(zi, γ0, γ1) + νi, Cov(i, νi) 6= 0
Table 2.1 lists the functional forms of f(·) considered. As one might expect, 2SLS holds
the biggest advantage when the first stage DGP is truly linear. Even so, it does not win
on every metric, and the neural network approach is not far behind. We look at several
cases, illustrated in figures 2.2 and 2.3.
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Figure 2.2 considers the relatively less noisy case, where we set σν = 50. Figure 2.2(f)
gives some intuition of what the noisy (X) and de-noised (f(Z, γ)) data look like. In
the figure we show an example of the first stage predictions from a single experiment
iteration with 500 observations, chosen randomly, based on the data that was drawn. The
x-axis measures the value of Zγ, and the y-axis measures the value of the corresponding
estimates. Since the DGP is linear in this case, the true signal corresponds to the 45◦
line through the origin. The scattered points are the actual values of X, and the other
two data series are Xˆ2SLS and XˆNN . From the image it is obvious that the linear method
more closely approximates the signal in this case, and the neural network slightly overfits,
picking up on more of the noise where data is sparser. We can see this is true on average
across all 2000 experiments of sample size 500, as the MSE(f)2SLS is smaller than the
MSE(f)NN . As the first five rows of table 2.2 show, the fit of both models improves with
larger sample sizes, although it remains true that MSE(f)2SLS < MSE(f)NN at each
sample size in the linear DGP case.
Understandably, the fit is worse when the first stage error has higher variance (σν = 200),
as it becomes more difficult to separate the signal from the noise for either method. One
can see the increase in the scatter of the data in figure 2.3(f). Table 2.2 shows that here
too, 2SLS manages to achieve a better fit, and for both methods the fit improves with
sample size.
In terms of estimating the parameter of interest, the slope on the endogenous variable,
we show the distribution of βˆ1,OLS , βˆ1,2SLS , and βˆ1,NN achieved across 2000 experiments
using datasets of various sizes. The intuition is once again that of repeated draws from
a population; in reality we would typically only have access to one such draw, so the
properties of the distribution from which this draw would be taken are important. In each
figure 2.2(a) to 2.2(e) and 2.3(a) to 2.3(e), we report the means and variances of βˆ1,2SLS
and βˆ1,NN , based on the empirical distribution observed at different sample sizes, as well
as the proportion of the time one would conclude erroneously that the bias in the OLS
estimate is positive rather than negative. Such incorrect qualitative inference is concerning
in applied work, as it can lead to unhelpful policy implications.
Every histogram of βˆ2SLS and βˆNN is labeled with the fraction of realizations not shown.
These are the automatically-determined outliers (using the MATLAB isoutlier function)
that are omitted from the histogram in order to keep all histograms readable. The absence
of these observations explains why a histogram’s mean may appear in an unintuitive
location, or potentially not appear at all within the limits of the x-axis shown.
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(a) Linear DGP, σν = 50, sample size = 100 (b) Linear DGP, σν = 50, sample size = 500
(c) Linear DGP, σν = 50, sample size = 1000 (d) Linear DGP, σν = 50, sample size = 5000
(e) Linear DGP, σν = 50, sample size = 10000
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(f) Linear DGP, σν = 50, sample size = 500
Figure 2.2: Results for linear first stage DGP at various sample sizes: low noise, σν = 50
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(a) Linear DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 100 (b) Linear DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 500
(c) Linear DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 1000 (d) Linear DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 5000
(e) Linear DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 10000
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(f) Linear DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 500
Figure 2.3: Results for linear first stage DGP at various sample sizes: high noise, σν = 200
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With the relatively high amount of noise we have introduced, we see that a sample size
of 100 is insufficient to guarantee good performance with either method, especially with
a noisier first stage. When σν = 200, βˆ2SLS leads us to the wrong qualitative conclusion
less frequently than does βˆNN , but not by much, 42.7% of the time versus 45.1% of the
time for the βˆNN . The numbers improve substantially when σν = 50, dropping to 4.05%
and 7.65%, respectively. As the sample size increases, the performance of both methods
improves. At every sample size, the researcher is more likely to draw the correct conclusion
regarding the direction of the bias in OLS using the 2SLS approach, but the variance of
βˆNN is consistently lower. If one happens to draw a particularly unfortunate sample, one
may get a much larger mis-estimate of β1 using 2SLS than one would using the NN.
As mentioned earlier, when the fitted values Xˆ pick up noise as well as signal, we can
expect the resulting estimate of β to be biased towards the OLS estimate. With a linear
first stage DGP, the neural network overall tends to fit the signal worse than does the
standard linear approach (table 2.2). It is true that in figures 2.2 and 2.3 both the mean
and median of βˆNN tend to be closer to the βˆOLS distribution than the mean and median
of βˆ2SLS . In some cases this actually appears to be a positive, as the combination of some
unfortunate small sample draws and high noise produces a mean βˆ2SLS estimate that is
much lower than the OLS estimates, when in fact OLS underestimates the true parameter
(see figures 2.3(a) and 2.3(b)).
We know that standard 2SLS estimates, though consistent, are biased in finite samples, so
just the fact that the βˆNN are biased is not enough to discredit the approach. Because the
neural net does slightly overfit the linear DGP, the method produces a higher variance in Xˆ
than does the 2SLS, leading to a lower variance of βˆNN . We can consider whether the trade-
off is worthwhile by calculating the mean squared error based on the empirical distributions
we generate, which approximate the true distributions. Table 2.3 reports the squared bias
of the parameter estimates plus the variance calculated across the experiments, (
¯ˆ
β1 −
β1)
2 + Var(βˆ1). Based on this measure, the slight increase in bias appears to be worth the
corresponding decrease in variance, as the neural network approach consistently produces
a lower mean squared error.
To more closely examine the trade-offs between using a neural network fit versus a linear
fit when the DGP is linear, we run an experiment with 10,000 iterations, each drawing a
sample of 100 data points (keeping σν = 50). A larger number of iterations should generate
more precise estimates of the true distributions of the βˆs. Because neither method can be
expected to perform faultlessly with such a small sample size, we can observe on which
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MSE(f) from first stage estimation
f(zi, γ) Sample size 2SLS NN
Linear (low noise, σν = 50)
100 51.45 102.75
500 10.05 25.29
1000 4.99 13.90
5000 1.01 3.62
10000 0.51 1.93
Linear (high noise, σν = 200)
100 792.34 1344.67
500 152.40 366.19
1000 79.73 222.61
5000 16.65 59.10
10000 8.05 30.82
Logistic
100 4113.58 3887.34
500 3531.55 1632.40
1000 3458.37 1032.67
5000 3403.57 262.15
10000 3393.78 118.05
Quadratic
100 16211.52 2571.67
500 16101.16 585.50
1000 16262.30 310.73
5000 16168.81 72.61
10000 16179.94 38.10
Sinusoid
100 4560.17 3057.95
500 3966.06 702.23
1000 3909.85 351.73
5000 3846.82 85.36
10000 3838.57 47.08
Sinusoid2
100 3930.76 2934.19
500 3375.65 716.87
1000 3317.93 374.71
5000 3264.44 83.51
10000 3257.60 44.12
Table 2.2: The fit achieved by 2SLS and NN in estimating the first stage. Lower values
indicate a closer approximation of the f(·) function. When the first stage DGP is linear,
2SLS is able to pick up on the underlying signal better than the NN; however, the opposite
is true in every other case.
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Bias-variance trade-off: MSE(βˆ)
f(zi, γ) Sample size 2SLS NN
Linear (low noise, σν = 50)
100 36.4684 25.8251
500 0.0887 0.0691
1000 0.0193 0.0186
5000 0.0039 0.0037
10000 0.0018 0.0018
Linear (high noise, σν = 200)
100 21.5109 14.7353
500 68.0767 22.8524
1000 23.0169 5.4814
5000 0.0147 0.0101
10000 0.0027 0.0021
Logistic
100 0.0057 0.0030
500 0.000552 0.000398
1000 0.000263 0.000196
5000 0.0000531 0.0000360
10000 0.0000258 0.0000173
Quadratic
100 11.6620 0.0239
500 14.7094 0.0025
1000 9.9449 0.0000989
5000 128.1043 0.0000198
10000 37.8169 0.00000938
Sinusoid
100 14.8204 1.6210
500 9.3106 0.0830
1000 10.1480 0.000476
5000 16.842 0.0000843
10000 17.7053 0.0000416
Sinusoid2
100 26.2067 1.0401
500 0.0753 0.0012
1000 0.0030 0.000416
5000 0.000447 0.0000842
10000 0.000213 0.0000406
Table 2.3: The MSEs of βˆ2SLS and βˆNN , calculated using (
¯ˆ
β1−β1)2+Var(βˆ1). The values
of the mean and variance are taken from the empirical distributions generated through
simulation. In each of the above cases, MSE(βˆNN ) ≤ MSE(βˆ2SLS).
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metrics each method does well and on which it falls short. In terms of the mean value,
both methods overestimate the true parameter value, 1, but the
¯ˆ
βNN is closer, 1.25 as
compared to 1.47. The median of the βˆ2SLS distribution is closer to 1, however, 0.9646
compared to 0.8168 for the NN. Both variances are high, but, predictably, the neural
network estimator variance is lower. The sum of the squared bias and variance is again
lower for the neural network approach, 1692.7 compared to 1866.8. The linear method
results in less incorrect qualitative inference here, as βˆ2SLS < βˆOLS 4.08% of the time, as
opposed to 7.34% of the time for the neural network. There are also more 2SLS estimates
clustered around the true parameter value. The standard deviation of the empirical βˆOLS
distribution is 0.0492. If we look within two OLS standard deviations of the true β, we find
1789 2SLS estimates and 1649 NN estimates (of the 10,000). However, it is also true that
we find more 2SLS estimates further away, which one expects, as that distribution has the
higher variance. Beyond 10 OLS standard deviations away from the true β, we find 2594
2SLS estimates and 2381 NN estimates. It is worth noting that with this small sample
size, only in 4505 instances did the γˆ1,OLS achieve a |t| value greater than 2. Of these,
it was still the case that in 34 of these instances, βˆ2SLS < βˆOLS , and the corresponding
number is 67 for the neural network.
We next consider the logistic DGP. As can be seen in figure 2.4(f), the function we choose is
quite nonlinear. In this case, the neural network is clearly better able to tease out the true
f function from the noise than can the linear fit, as is evidenced by the MSE(f) values
reported in table 2.2. Nonetheless, there is a clear positive slope for the linear method to
pick up, and 2SLS performs well. The mean of the βˆ2SLS distribution approaches 1, the
true value of β1, more quickly than does the mean of the distribution of βˆNN , although the
performance of the latter does not lag far behind in this regard. As before, the distribution
of βˆNN has a lower variance than does the standard 2SLS estimate at every sample size.
This makes sense – as the neural network is able to fit the underlying signal more closely,
the residuals νˆi are closer to the actual realizations of νi. The estimated variance of the
error is thus closer to the true value σ2ν , as opposed to overestimating it. Because the
variance in the data is fixed, correspondingly the xˆi,NN have a higher variance, leading
to a lower variance of the βˆ. Table 2.3 shows the mean squared error of the second stage
estimate for both methods. Once again, it appears that the decrease in variance generated
by the neural network approach outweighs any increase in bias.
From a practical point of view, so long as there is a strong positive or negative relationship
that 2SLS is able to pick up between the x and the z, regardless of which sample happens
to be drawn, performance between the NN approach and the standard 2SLS approach is
65
(a) Logistic DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 100 (b) Logistic DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 500
(c) Logistic DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 1000 (d) Logistic DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 5000
(e) Logistic DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 10000
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(f) Logistic DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 500
Figure 2.4: Results for logistic first stage DGP at various sample sizes
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(a) Sinusoid2 DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 100 (b) Sinusoid2 DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 500
(c) Sinusoid2 DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 1000 (d) Sinusoid2 DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 5000
(e) Sinusoid2 DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 10000
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(f) Sinusoid2 DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 500
Figure 2.5: Results for sinusoid2 (sine) first stage DGP at various sample sizes
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fairly similar. Encouragingly, any potential overfitting by the neural network does not lead
to misestimation of the parameters of interest, and in fact the neural network approach
generates estimates with a lower mean squared error, even when there is evidence that
the linear method fits the underlying (linear) signal more closely. We further test whether
overfitting can be a problem by comparing performance of the two methods when there
truly is no relationship between the instrument used and x. This is reported in the next
section, 2.5.2, and the results are encouraging.
Of course, if the sample size is small and the average slope of the relationship between z
and x is not so far from 0, the differences in performance of 2SLS and NN may become
relevant. As an example, we present figure 2.5. The x here is a sine function of γ1z (plus
noise; see table 2.1 for details). As sine is an odd function and z is sampled from a mean 0
distribution, overall there tends to be a slope for the linear method to identify. However,
this is weaker than in the linear or logistic cases, and one can see that with a smaller
sample size, one is more likely to make an incorrect qualitative inference. The fraction of
time βˆ2SLS < βˆOLS is 13.5%, whereas it is only approximately 4% when using the neural
network first stage (sample size 100, figure 2.5(a)). Even with larger sample sizes, one can
clearly see that the neural network first stage achieves a lower βˆ variance without much
risk of biased estimation; the NN estimates’ mean squared error is once again lower (table
2.3). As in practical applications we typically only observe one sample, i.e. one draw from
the DGP, drawing from the tighter distribution is more likely to result in a point estimate
closer to the true parameter value.
We now discuss the type of case where 2SLS fails to perform and where the advantage
of using a neural network becomes apparent. Figure 2.6 demonstrates what can occur if
the f(·) is quadratic. We emphasize that it is unnecessary to guess at the exact nature
of the relationship between z and x. One simply inputs the exogenous variables and/or
instrument, and the neural network estimation derives the relationship from the data.
With a quadratic function, xi = (γ1zi)
2 +νi, the average slope of the relationship between
x and z tends to be approximately 0. Even though in truth there is a strong association
between the two variables, z appears to be a very weak instrument when using the conven-
tional method. This reflects in the performance of βˆ2SLS , which produces untrustworthy
estimates. Even at the largest sample size we use in our experiments, βˆ2SLS < βˆOLS over
40% of the time (figure 2.6(e)). Its variance and its bias are both high, and estimates
of β1 can be very far from the true parameter value, depending on the researcher’s luck
in drawing a data sample. The performance of βˆ2SLS does not improve in any way with
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sample size. This can be seen in its mean squared error in table 2.3, which remains high
and erratic, while the corresponding NN statistic becomes smaller and smaller. The neural
network first stage fits the underlying signal much more closely (table 2.2) and produces
a βˆ distribution which becomes more and more centered on the true parameter value,
becoming tighter as the sample size increases.
It is important to note that even when 2SLS is able to find a “strong” relationship in a
particular data sample, this is no guarantee of a good estimate of β1. For example, while
in most samples the value of γˆ1 is not statistically significantly different from 0 under the
quadratic first stage DGP, there are some samples in which the corresponding t-value is
large enough to reject H0 : γ1 = 0. The instrument appears to be strong enough. We look
at the βˆ2SLS that result from data samples in which |t| > 2. In one experiment of 2000
iterations, 226 samples meet this criterion. Of these, 26% produce a βˆ2SLS which is smaller
than the corresponding βˆOLS , which could lead the researcher to the incorrect conclusion
that βˆOLS overestimates, rather than underestimates, the true effect β1. In comparison,
of these 226 cases, βˆNN is never smaller than the corresponding βˆOLS , and even though
the instrument appears “strong”, in these samples the neural network approach produces
estimates both less biased and more precise than does the 2SLS.
If one attempts to use an instrument which one expects to fulfil the validity and relevance
requirements, perhaps relying on economic theory, it may be possible that the relationship
between the instrument and the endogenous regressor is not simply linear, and perhaps
the estimate of the average slope is not statistically significant. It is then worth exploring
this possibility by estimating the first stage using a neural network. If there truly is no
relationship, the neural network should be unable to find one, just as the linear method
would fail. However, if there is a nonlinear relationship between the two variables, this may
improve the resulting estimates and obviate the need to search for a different instrument.
One can imagine any number of possible examples; we present one more. In figure 2.7,
the first stage DGP is a periodic relationship, constructed (or could be sampled) in such
a way that there is no overall positive or negative slope for a linear fit to pick up. Once
again, βˆ2SLS suffers from high variance and bias, leading to βˆ2SLS < βˆOLS approximately
half the time, at any sample size (so, is very much biased towards the OLS, as we would
expect). The neural network does a better job of picking up on the underlying relationship
between z and x, and produces estimates of β1 which are both closer to the truth and
more precisely estimated.
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(a) Quadratic DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 100 (b) Quadratic DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 500
(c) Quadratic DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 1000 (d) Quadratic DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 5000
(e) Quadratic DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 10000
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(f) Quadratic DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 500
Figure 2.6: Results for quadratic first stage DGP at various sample sizes
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(a) Sinusoid DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 100 (b) Sinusoid DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 500
(c) Sinusoid DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 1000 (d) Sinusoid DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 5000
(e) Sinusoid DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 10000
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(f) Sinusoid DGP, σν = 200, sample size = 500
Figure 2.7: Results for sinusoid (cosine) first stage DGP at various sample sizes
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2.5.2 Weak instrument
A researcher may take comfort in knowing that if no relationship exists between x and
the chosen z, there should be a statistically insignificant linear slope between the two.
Earlier we demonstrated that even in the absence of a statistically significant linear slope,
a strong nonlinear relationship may well exist, and it is clear that in those constructed
examples the neural network does pick up on the actual truth. Could it be the case that
a neural network would find what seems to be a similarly strong relationship even when
none truly exists? Would it overfit to the noise and produce estimates of βˆ that appear
reasonable, even though they are incorrect?
Figure 2.8 shows this to be unlikely, and in fact the lower variance of the βˆNN estimates
once again turns out to be an advantage. We touched earlier on what happens in the
linear DGP when the signal is obscured by more or less noise (σν = 50 or 200), making the
instrument relatively weaker or stronger. With a weaker instrument and smaller sample
size, both the 2SLS and the NN estimates are biased towards the OLS. In the completely
weak instrument case which we now explore (no relationship between the instrument used
and x), we thus expect that the βˆs should be estimating the same value as βˆOLS . This is
indeed what happens, but the
¯ˆ
βNN is closer to
¯ˆ
βOLS in both of the cases considered, and
its variance is much lower in both cases.
2.5.3 Dummy endogenous variable
The most obvious nonlinearity one is likely to encounter in practice is a dummy endogenous
variable. If the values of the instrument are drawn from a continuous distribution, one
may be tempted to estimate the relationship using logit or probit. So long as the resulting
Xˆ is used as an instrument in the second stage, this can be done, and may improve the
efficiency of the estimates as compared to 2SLS. The estimation can also be carried out
using a neural network, with similar benefits.
We model the dummy variable x using a latent variable model. Table 2.1 shows all of
the DGPs considered. The basic approach is to model the value of x as depending on
the value of an (unobserved in practice) x∗, which in turn is related to the instrument z
through some function f(·), plus an error ν, which is distributed normally. We thus refer
to this set of experiments as “probit”.
The simplest case is when the relationship is linear. Suppose z is an individual’s age, f(z, γ)
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(a) Linear DGP, noise used as instrument, σν = 200
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(b) Quadratic DGP, noise used as instrument, σν =
200
(c) Linear DGP, noise used as instrument, σν = 200 (d) Quadratic DGP, noise used as instrument, σν =
200
(e) Linear DGP, noise used as instrument, t values (f) Quadratic DGP, noise used as instrument, t val-
ues
Figure 2.8: Weak instrument performance. Both approaches similarly fail to perform when
the instrument used to form xˆi in fact has no relation to the xi (which is still formed using
f(zi, γ) + νi, so zi is the instrument that should be used). However, the
¯ˆ
βNN falls closer
to
¯ˆ
βOLS (as the parameter estimates should, in this case) and has a lower variance in both
examples.
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is the true value gained for someone of that age from being enrolled in grade school, and
ν is any individual uncertainty around that measure. We can then think of x∗ as the
value the individual (or her parents) thinks she derives from grade school attendance,
and observe x, the binary decision of whether or not to enroll. In this example, one can
suppose that at a young age, the value of school attendance is high but decreasing with
z, so the probability of grade school enrollment will drop with age.
Other relationships may not be linear. Suppose our x variable is minivan ownership, x∗
the corresponding perceived utility, and let z again be age. Young people likely have a
low utility of minivan ownership. As they get older and start a family, a minivan becomes
more useful. Once the children grow up, the utility may once again fall. In this example,
f(·) may be closer to quadratic, but is certainly not linear.
We begin by considering a linear DGP for the x∗. Figure 2.9 demonstrates the performance
of the linear and NN approaches in a high and low noise scenario. We graph the probability
of observing 1 as estimated by both methods; these are the Xˆ. We also plot the binary
X data as observed, and what it would be in the noiseless case (labeled as f(Z, γ)). One
can think of this as having perfect information regarding the value of school enrollment in
the previous example, so that enrollment occurs until the age at which the value becomes
negative, after which it ceases.
The results are similar to the linear case discussed in section 2.5.1. In the noisy case
(σν = 200), neither approach performs very strongly and both are biased towards the
OLS estimate, though for the first time βˆ2SLS has a slightly lower variance than βˆNN
(figure 2.9(c)). When the odds of observing a 1 are nearly 50-50 at every instrument
value, both methods find it difficult to disentangle the true signal from the noise, resulting
in widely varying estimates that frequently misidentify the direction of the OLS bias.
Both approaches perform better when less noise is present (σν = 10), rendering the instru-
ment stronger. As before, the neural network manages to fit the first stage signal more
closely. βˆNN is slightly more biased than is βˆ2SLS , but has a lower variance, which results
in a lower mean squared error of the estimator. While we report results only for sample
size 1000, the intuition regarding how performance varies with sample size developed in
section 2.5.1 continues to apply.
In figures 2.10, 2.11, and 2.12 we report the results for more complex first stage probit
DGPs. Each case shown is the result of 2000 experiment iterations, with a sample size
of 1000 in each case. As before, the linear approach is very poorly tailored to handle the
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(a) Probit (linear) DGP, σν = 200
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(b) Probit (linear) DGP, σν = 10
(c) Probit (linear) DGP, σν = 200 (d) Probit (linear) DGP, σν = 10
(e) Probit (linear) DGP, σν = 200 (f) Probit (linear) DGP, σν = 10
Figure 2.9: Dummy endogenous regressor with linear latent DGP (normally distributed
ν). The figures in the left column, 2.9(a), 2.9(c), and 2.9(e), show results for σν = 200;
the figures in the right column show results for σν = 10. In both cases, xi = 1 is observed
if x∗i = γ0 + γ1zi + νi > 0, and xi = 0 otherwise. The red dots show the “true” xi if νi
were 0.
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(a) Probit (logistic) DGP
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(b) Probit (quadratic) DGP
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(c) Probit (sinusoid) DGP
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(d) Probit (sinusoid2) DGP
Figure 2.10: Dummy endogenous regressor with latent DGPs described by various func-
tions. xi = 1 is observed if x
∗
i = f(zi, γ) + νi > 0; otherwise, xi = 0 is observed. The
figure shows example first stage fits from a single experiment iteration with different first
stage DGPs. The red dots show the “true” xi if all νi were 0.
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(a) Probit (logistic) DGP (b) Probit (quadratic) DGP
(c) Probit (sinusoid) DGP (d) Probit (sinusoid2) DGP
Figure 2.11: Dummy endogenous regressor with latent DGPs described by various func-
tions. xi = 1 is observed if x
∗
i = f(zi, γ) + νi > 0; otherwise, xi = 0 is observed. The
figure shows the values of βˆ achieved using each estimation method.
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(a) Probit (logistic) DGP (b) Probit (quadratic) DGP
(c) Probit (sinusoid) DGP (d) Probit (sinusoid2) DGP
Figure 2.12: Dummy endogenous regressor with latent DGPs described by various func-
tions. xi = 1 is observed if x
∗
i = f(zi, γ) + νi > 0; otherwise, xi = 0 is observed. The
figure shows the t values when testing the strength of the instrument in the first stage of
2SLS.
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quadratic and sinusoid (cosine) nonlinearities. (Certainly, the researcher could transform
the variable prior to applying the linear method, but that requires a guess of the func-
tional form, which it is unclear how to determine and is unnecessary when using the NN
approach.) In both of those cases, the βˆ2SLS are much more biased and have a higher
variance than do the βˆNN (figures 2.11(b) and 2.11(c)). This is because when estimated
linearly, the instrument appears weak (figures 2.12(b) and 2.12(c)). Because there is more
than a single switch in the (de-noised) dummy variable, 0 to 1 and back, over the domain
of the instrument, the linear method struggles – as would standard probit, for that matter,
unless the instrument were correctly transformed before being used in the estimation.
In the remaining two cases, 2SLS manages to produce reasonable results, though it still
performs best when there is only a single switch of the (de-noised) dummy variable from
0 to 1, as occurs in the logistic cdf DGP case. Here, as before, the βˆNN is slightly more
biased towards the OLS estimate, but this is more than made up for by a decrease in
variance, leading to an overall lower mean squared error of the estimator.
When the f(·) is as specified for sinusoid2, 2SLS does manage to find that there is a
relationship between z and x, but it is relatively weak (figure 2.12(d)). The βˆ2SLS estimates
are thus both more biased, actually overestimating the true parameter value on average,
and much more spread out than the βˆNN . They are also slightly more likely to produce a
point estimate of β which is lower than that produced by OLS.
2.6 Discussion: extensions
Our results indicate that exploring the possible nonlinearity in the relationship between
an instrument and the regressor for which it is being used can be worthwhile. In most
cases, the gain is in the efficiency of the estimators, but as we have shown, unaccounted-for
nonlinearity can also lead a linear method astray. A few more components are required,
however, before the method can be applied in practice on non-simulated data.
2.6.1 Variance
In reporting our results, we rely on the empirical variance observed across samples, as
we consider it the clearest and most accurate way to describe the comparison between
methods. When applying these methods in practice, multiple samples are not available,
so a formula is required to calculate the variance of the estimator. For standard 2SLS,
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assuming homoskedasticity, it is the following:
AVar(βˆ2SLS) = σ
2
 (X
′Z(Z ′Z)−1Z ′X)−1 (2.5)
The above result holds when using Z as an instrument. When we estimate βˆNN , we use
XˆNN = fˆ as an instrument. So long as fˆ is a valid instrument, the same formula as above
will hold. If Z and  are independent, as they are in our simulations, then any function of
the instrument should also be independent of , resulting in fˆ being a valid instrument.
Independence is a strong requirement, but if it is met, the derivation proceeds as usual:
√
n(βˆNN − β) =
√
n({fˆ ′X}−1fˆ ′) =
(
fˆ ′X
n
)−1 1√
n
fˆ ′
plim
(
fˆ ′X
n
)
= QFX∗
plim
1√
n
fˆ ′ = plim
√
n · 1
n
∑
i
fˆii
Var[fˆii] = E[(fˆii − E(fˆii))(fˆii − E(fˆii))′] = E[(fˆii)(fˆii)′] = E[fˆii′ifˆ ′i ] =
= E[fˆi E{2i |Z} fˆ ′i ] = σ2E[fˆifˆ ′i ] = σ2Qi ⇒ Var
[
1
n
∑
i
fˆii
]
= σ2Q
(2.6)
So long as the data are well-behaved and no particular Qi dominates, the last line will
hold true. We can then apply the Lindeberg-Feller central limit theorem to say that:(
1√
n
)
fˆ ′ d−→ N [0, σ2Q] ⇒
Q−1FX
(
1√
n
)
fˆ ′ d−→ N [0, σ2 Q−1FX Q Q−1XF ]
(2.7)
Rearranging the expression for the variance, we can rewrite it as:
AVar(βˆNN ) = σ
2
 (X
′fˆ (fˆ ′fˆ)−1fˆ ′X)−1 (2.8)
It may be possible to relax the independence assumption; we leave this for future research.
In the simulations, the variance values calculated in each sample are close to the variance
of the distribution across samples.
§The usual conditions apply; QFX must have full rank. This will occur if each exogenous variable in
the model acts as its own instrument, and each endogenous variable is predicted in such a way that it is
not a linear combination of other variables.
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2.6.2 Statistical significance
Although it is not a foolproof way of establishing the relevance of an instrument, statistical
testing of the significance of the coefficients in a linear first stage can reassure the researcher
that some relationship exists. In estimating a potentially nonlinear relationship using a
neural network, we do not have an obvious way of testing whether the relationship is
significant. Several possibilities exist to check for a statistical relationship, but we are not
aware of a test of nonlinear significance analogous to the F test.
One approach is to calculate a “nonlinear correlation” between instrument and endogenous
regressor, such as the maximal information coefficient, or MIC (Reshef et al., 2011; Speed,
2011). The MIC falls within the range [0,1]. 0 represents no relationship between two
variables, and 1 corresponds to some kind of noise-free relationship, which does not have
to be linear. This provides a useful statistic, but unfortunately does not hint at the
distribution of this statistic in the population, so there are no standard errors to calculate
which would suggest whether the point estimate is different from zero. It may be possible
to develop the necessary theory, but a potential approach in the meanwhile is to perform
a bootstrap estimation to approximate this distribution.
Another alternative is to test the parameters that the neural network training algorithm
determines. Once the model is estimated, it is a particular nonlinear functional form.
Knowing the shape of the relationship can allow the researcher to re-estimate it using
methods that allow for a standard error to be calculated. Unfortunately, neural networks
(as they are currently understood and implemented) do not produce statistics one can use
to determine statistical significance directly.
Finally, it is the nonlinearity that is important to detect. A neural network approach is
only one way in which to do it. For a simple model, then, it is possible to use the neural
network estimation for exploratory analysis. This allows the researcher to initially remain
fairly agnostic about the shape of the relationship between instrument and regressor, but
later to develop a hypothesis. If one can visualize the relationship the neural network
predicts, an obvious improvement on the standard linear approach may become apparent.
For instance, including a quadratic term may clearly improve fit, or perhaps a periodic
relationship will be detected. In that case, the researcher can transform the data based
on the resulting hypothesis prior to running standard linear estimation, which would then
estimate the imposed relationship and allow for straightforward significance testing.
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2.6.3 More complicated models
There are further interesting extensions that can be explored, which we leave for future
research. For instance, does the gain in efficiency persist in more complicated models
with numerous endogenous variables and instruments? How is performance affected if
errors are not symmetric but instead positively or negatively skewed? Another interest-
ing consideration is whether we even need an instrument if we estimate the first stage
nonlinearly.
Angrist and Pischke (2009) reference this possibility, but dismiss it as uninterpretable.
Potentially, there can be an interpretation. It is not always necessary to find instruments
outside of the model being estimated; for example lags are commonly used as instruments
when estimating time series regressions. If we omit overtly including an outside instrument
when estimating the first stage and instead predict the endogenous variable using some
nonlinear combination of exogenous regressors, this is not so different from using a lag of
a variable as an instrument – although of course there should be a reasonable underlying
theory as to why a nonlinear function of some of the variables would shift the endogenous
regressor. It may, however, be possible that the square of one of the variables could be
used as an instrument for a different variable, if it is not already present in the regression.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we present evidence of the impact a nonlinear underlying DGP in the first
stage of 2SLS can have on the estimation of the parameters of interest in the second stage.
While in some cases an undetected first stage relationship is simply a missed opportunity,
and the researcher can proceed using a different instrument, in other cases the linearly-
estimated relationship can appear statistically significant while incorrectly estimating the
true DGP, resulting in misleading inference. Neural networks provide a way to explore
potential nonlinearity while avoiding the constraint of imposing a specific set of functional
forms – researchers can rely on their great flexibility and the property of universality to
trace out a wide class of functions. Further research is needed to determine what aspects
of the estimation method influence the performance of neural network based IV estimates
of second stage parameters, but we believe it to be a promising approach.
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Chapter 3
Suboptimal Decision-Making on
Stochastic Lotteries in Indonesia
3.1 Introduction
What is preferable, £1500 per month with certainty, or a gamble to earn either £1500
or £3000 per month with equal probability? A rational economic actor would find this
question trivially simple; yet 42% of respondents to the 2007 Indonesia Family Life Survey
may disagree. How could so many respondents answer such a fundamental question to
good economic decision-making incorrectly?
Recent studies have observed numerous behavioral anomalies in which economic theory
based on standard rationality assumptions fails to explain the behavior of individuals (e.g.
Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Shogren and Taylor, 2008;
McFadden, 1999). Rabin and Thaler (2001) argue that people are closer to being myopic
loss-averters than expected utility maximizers because they seem to assess risk differently
for small and for large gambles. Agents do not display approximate risk-neutrality at
the level of small gambles, which we would observe if standard expected utility theory
characterized their decision-making. Gneezy et al. (2006) observe what they call the
“uncertainty effect”. In a series of experiments, they show that groups of individuals on
average value a gamble with two possible outcomes less than they value each individual
outcome, violating internality. Ambiguity aversion is another behavioral anomaly first
noted by Keynes (1921) and later elaborated upon by Ellsberg (1961) and others. It de-
scribes individuals’ preferences towards clearly-defined known risks (known probabilities of
various outcomes) rather than unknown risks, even in situations where, according to stan-
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dard economic theory, it does not matter. Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) develop a theory to
explain unexpected behaviors such as the endowment effect, which is sometimes observed
in individuals, explaining it as a matter of the expectations people hold. This paper seeks
to extend the literature by applying a modified version of Ko˝szegi and Rabin’s theory to
explain why individuals may turn down an option which on the surface may seem like an
obvious improvement.
Respondents in Indonesia were presented with a choice between a sure option and a strictly
favorable gamble (a purely hypothetical choice with no real money involved), and a large
number of them chose the sure option. Specifically, in the 2007 Indonesia Family Life
Survey (IFLS) (Strauss et al., 2009), Book 3a, Section SI, respondents are asked:
Question 1 Suppose you are offered two ways to earn some money. With option 1,
you are guaranteed Rp. 800 thousand per month. With option 2 you have an equal
chance of either the same income, Rp. 800 thousand per month, or, if you are lucky,
Rp. 1.6 million per month, which is more. Which option will you choose?
If the respondent chooses the certain option, he or she is prompted to reconsider, to make
sure that option 1 is truly his or her preference:
Are you sure? In option 2 you will get at least Rp. 800 thousand per month and
you may get Rp. 1.6 million per month. In option 1, you will always get Rp. 800
thousand per month.
To anyone familiar with economic theory, option 2 clearly dominates option 1. Yet 45%
of respondents choose option 1, and less than 8% of those individuals change their mind
when asked if they are sure, which amounts to over 40% of the full sample choosing and
sticking with option 1. One could say respondents simply don’t understand the question
and guess at the answer. Perhaps if real money were involved and respondents previously
observed transactions occurring, they would choose differently. However, there is little
reason for them to lie about their preferences — if so, why would 60% of respondents still
choose option 2? — and it seems unlikely that they are choosing randomly, as answers to
other similar questions do not display such an erratic pattern. Given the large number of
people choosing each option, as well as the observation that a significant minority of even
the most highly-educated people in the sample choose option 1, it seems there is some
intentionality in their answers.
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The explanation I develop in this paper is based on an application of Ko˝szegi and Rabin’s
(2006) reference-dependent utility. I hypothesize that individuals choose as they do due
to a combination of aversion to losses and anchoring on the tempting higher outcome.
If the higher outcome is not realized, it is interpreted as a loss, and the individual is
disappointed. In order to avoid such disappointment, some individuals choose to avoid
the lottery, preferring the certain option with its lack of surprises.
In section 2, I discuss possible alternative explanations and other influences which may
impact the choice observed in Question 1 alongside the modeled explanation. Section
3 presents the model. Section 4 estimates the effect of individual characteristics or life
circumstances which may influence the person’s decision-making. Section 5 discusses the
potential implications of the observed behavior on the lives of the individuals choosing the
dominated option. Section 6 presents possible avenues for future research and discusses
policy implications. Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Possible Explanations
There may be numerous reasons why the respondents choose as they do. Self-aware re-
spondents may be wary of the higher-income money-making opportunity if they think
they would be unable to put the extra money to productive use, and instead spend it on
alcohol, sugar, cigarettes, or similar “temptation goods”. While we cannot decipher which
individuals may be sophisticated hyperbolic discounters, we do observe the consumption
of these goods at the household level, which can be interpreted as the degree to which
members of the household give in to temptation. I construct a total weekly spend on
sugar, soft drinks, alcohol, betel nut, cigarettes, and pre-prepared food. Controlling for
an individual’s income, a higher (household) consumption of temptation goods is actu-
ally associated with a slightly lower probability of choosing the dominated option1. The
propensity to choose the dominated option does not seem to result from any attempts at
self-control.
Respondents who live in unsafe circumstances may feel that having relatively too much
money could draw attention to them, perhaps putting them in danger. The median
monthly income earned among those reporting an income, 16,745 respondents, is Rp.
500,000 per month. Perhaps Rp. 800,000 per month is already quite generous in com-
1The effect on the choice is nearly negligible, less than 1 percentage point, but it is statistically
significant with t=-2.49. Including only those households with one respondent leaves the estimate small
and negative, but no longer statistically significant.
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parison. I check if vulnerability may potentially explain the choice to turn down “excess”
money by checking how the likelihood of this choice varies with subjectively-reported feel-
ings of safety in the community. I find that there is no statistically significant difference
between those respondents who feel safe (the majority) and those who do not.
Respondents may misunderstand or reinterpret the question. Since they are asked about
“ways to earn some money”, they may well consider the kinds of jobs that pay the salaries
stated and project the characteristics of those jobs onto the question at hand. Alterna-
tively, while the question states that there is an “equal chance” of either outcome, it is
possible to interpret that statement as there being a probability p of each stated outcome
and some probability 1− 2p of receiving neither.
To account for the possibility that respondents are not paying attention or are not seriously
responding to the survey, I check if those whom the interviewer judged to be inattentive
are more prone to choosing the dominated option. That is indeed the case, but does
little to explain how frequently the dominated option is chosen. Among those taking
the survey seriously, which is most participants, 41.6% choose “incorrectly”. Among the
rest, the fraction is 43.4%. The difference is only statistically significant at the 10% level.
Accounting for children or other adults being present during the interview yields similar
results – greater potential for distraction corresponds to a statistically significant higher
likelihood of choosing the dominated option, but the difference is slight.
A lack of education may lead individuals to reason in nonstandard or illogical ways. Having
attended junior or senior high school is associated with a highly statistically significant 9
percentage point lower probability of choosing the dominated option relative to someone
who is less educated. If the respondent has attended tertiary education, the effect is an
even higher 19 percentage points. However, even among those who have attended tertiary
education, 28.4% still choose the dominated option. It is possible that a lack of education
contributes to misunderstanding the question and selecting the dominated option, but a
lack of understanding does not seem to be the only channel which impacts the probability
of choosing “incorrectly”.
It is likely that framing also plays a role. In the question I describe, the extra money is
framed as a gain one receives if one is “lucky”, and 42% of respondents turn down the
extra gain. The survey contains a similar later question framed as a loss:
Question 2 Suppose you are offered two ways to earn some money. With option 1,
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you are guaranteed an income of Rp. 4 million per month. With option 2 you have
an equal chance of either the same income, Rp. 4 million per month, or, if you are
unlucky, Rp. 2 million per month, which is less. Which option will you choose?
Similarly to the previous question, respondents who choose the now-undesirable lottery in
this scenario are prompted to reconsider, and many fewer respondents make a “mistake”.
Of the 28,904 respondents who answered the question, only 8% choose the second option
and stick with it when asked a second time. Here, the Rp. 2 million per month outcome
is presented as an unnecessary loss. While the difference in numbers used in the questions
makes direct comparison not quite straightforward, it seems reasonable that the want to
avoid a loss — the decrease in utility from which is accepted to be more than the increase
in utility from a comparable gain — would drive more people towards making the rational
choice according to economic theory than a want to pursue a gain.
3.3 Model
To explain the puzzle, I apply a version of Ko˝szegi and Rabin’s (2006) model. They
model utility as being reference-dependent, defining the utility function as: u(c|r) =
m(c) +µ[m(c)−m(r)], where m(c) is a usual concave utility function and µ[m(c)−m(r)]
is an adjustment to the utility derived from consumption depending on how far it is from
expectations. µ(·) is a function with properties described in Kahneman and Tversky’s
prospect theory. I take the simplest form of the µ(·) function:
µ(x) =

x x ≥ 0
βx x < 0
, where β > 1 (3.1)
In the lottery example presented in Question 1, there are two possible outcomes, x and
2x, where x corresponds to Rp. 800 thousand, and 2x corresponds to Rp. 1.6 million.
Their alternative is a certain x. The reference point is modelled stochastically and can
be different for each person. Individuals can anchor on x with probability p and they can
anchor on 2x with probability 1 − p. The individual’s characteristics or past experience
shape their value of p. An individual is thus fully defined by their m(·) function, p, and
β.
Option 1, as presented in the question, guarantees a utility of m(x). There are no other
outcomes for which one might hope, so the reference point is the same certain outcome.
89
If one’s reference point is x, the expected utility of Option 2 becomes:
E(u2|r = x) = .5m(x) + .5[m(2x) + {m(2x)−m(x)}] (3.2)
If one’s reference point is 2x, the expected utility is the following:
E(u2|r = 2x) = .5[m(x) + β{m(x)−m(2x)}] + .5m(2x) (3.3)
The overall expected utility of choosing Option 2 is thus:
E(u2) = p · E(u2|r = x) + (1− p) · E(u2|r = 2x) =
= .5 · {(m(x) +m(2x)) + (m(2x)−m(x)) · [p− (1− p)β]︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ
} (3.4)
It makes sense to choose the certain option over the lottery if its expected utility is
higher, in other words when m(x) = E(u1) > E(u2). Comparing the two expressions and
simplifying shows that this occurs when θ < −1. This is equivalent to p < β−1β+1 . Given the
constraints of the µ(·) function, we know that β must be greater than 1; the case where
it equals 1 corresponds to no loss aversion. As β increases and the individual becomes
more and more loss averse, the right-hand side of the expression also increases, making
it more likely that an individual’s p falls below the threshold. If they are to choose the
lottery, the increasingly loss averse individual must be more and more likely to anchor on
x as their reference point, as opposed to 2x, to avoid the pain of disappointment. If an
individual is highly loss averse, putting even a small weight on the high outcome may be
enough for them to prefer the certain option. Hoping to get 2x and then receiving only x
is too disappointing.
We can perform the same analysis on Question 2. Here, the certain option is now 2x (Rp.
4 million), and the lottery is over x (Rp. 2 million) and 2x (Rp. 4 million). The certain
option now dominates the lottery. The condition which ensures the agent will choose the
lottery in this case is θ > 1, which corresponds to β < −1. This is impossible, as β
must be greater than 1. The model thus predicts that no one should choose the lottery in
Question 2 due to their loss aversion. Indeed, nearly all respondents answer that question
as we would expect. Those that choose the lottery must be doing so for some other reason,
unless perhaps they are risk loving and find more pleasure in gains than pain in losses.
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3.4 Estimation
We now have a framework through which to interpret the choice an individual is making.
Some characteristics or circumstances may directly increase the probability of making an
unintentional mistake, such as a lack of education, and some act through the channel of
deliberate decision-making by a loss-averse agent. For example, one’s past experience may
leave one strongly averse to losses (high β) or may affect the option on which one anchors
(p).
I now estimate how the likelihood of choosing the stochastically dominated option in
Question 1 varies across people as their circumstances or their traits change, and discuss
how these impacts may be interpreted in the disappointment aversion framework. The
data unfortunately do not provide a measure of the respondents’ loss aversion, nor is
there any direct indication of how they may likely be forming their reference point. I
use a simple regression to document the effects for easy interpretability2, and I allow for
household-level clusters in the error term.
Table 3.1 shows the results. We see that as before, whether the respondent is focused on
the interview or not does not seem to play much of a role in determining their choice, so
selecting the dominated option does not appear to be due to an inattentive mistake.
One may suppose that feeling a lack of safety may induce a greater degree of loss aversion,
as those who feel vulnerable or precarious may suffer more when they incur a loss. Those
who consider their community to be safe are indeed less likely to choose the dominated
option, but this is only borderline statistically significant.
There is some evidence that we may become more loss averse as we age (Kurnianingsih
et al., 2015), and we do see that the older the respondent, the more likely they are to
choose the dominated option. Respondents in the sample range from 15 to 100 years old,
and each decade increase in age is associated with a 1.7 percentage point increase in the
probability of selecting the dominated option, even after controlling for education. This
is a steady progression across the entire age support.
It appears women choose the dominated option more frequently than do men, even after
controlling for feelings of safety in the community, level of education, and work activities.
It is possible there may be cultural reasons why women are more likely to prefer the
2The resulting subgroups of the population tend to have 20%-60% of the group choosing the stochasti-
cally dominated option. Since we observe middle levels of the probability of choosing this option, a linear
approximation should give reasonable estimates of the marginal effects without predicting probabilities
outside of the [0,1] range.
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Factors affecting decision-making
Coefficient Std. Err.
Respondent attentive -.0180983 .0156722
Community feels safe -.0351520 .0217222
Age .0017077∗∗∗ .0003504
Female .07482700∗∗∗ .0082661
Attended Jr/Sr HS -.0672507∗∗∗ .0094423
Attended tertiary -.1399806∗∗∗ .0133777
High income -.0625559∗∗∗ .0091904
Primary daily activity:
Not working -.0159632 .0137188
In school -.0805185∗ .0431520
Self-emp. (no paid emp.) -.0202286∗∗∗ .0088575
Self-emp. (≥ 1 paid emp.) -.0745017∗∗∗ .0254097
Constant .4329111∗∗∗ .0293526
n 15,594
Table 3.1: Likelihood of choosing stochastically dominated option presented in Question
1 across various sub-populations. The education dummies correspond to highest level of
schooling attended. The high income dummy is 1 for individuals whose annual income is
Rp. 800,000 or higher and 0 otherwise. The omitted category of primary daily activity is
salaried employment. Errors are clustered at the household level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
smaller, certain amount of money. Alternatively, it may be because women are more loss
averse or more likely to anchor on the higher value, so the potential disappointment from
the gamble makes the certain option more preferable. It has not yet been established
whether men or women are more averse to losses (e.g. Bouchouich et al., 2019).
It was mentioned earlier that higher education is associated with a statistically significantly
much lower probability of selecting the dominated option, and this remains the case after
controlling for other factors, although the estimates decrease slightly. It seems likely that
education could have a direct effect on how an individual considers questions such as
Question 1, as it may be better understood and more likely to be regarded as an academic
exercise with a correct and incorrect answer. A higher level of education may also induce
the individual to consider choices more logically and less emotionally. If so, education
could also potentially lower a person’s level of loss aversion.
A higher annual income is associated with better decision-making. In particular, those
who earn above Rp. 800,000 per month are 6.3 percentage points less likely to choose the
dominated option, and this difference is statistically significant. Having a lower income
may lead one to simultaneously feel greater distress at losses and to also anchor on the
tempting high amount. This combination would then lead those with a lower income to
avoid the gamble in order to avoid disappointment. It may also be the case that those
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with a higher annual income can approach the gamble more dispassionately and form a
reference point with p = .5 as opposed to focusing on the higher value.
Finally, I look at how people respond differently based on their main daily activity, tak-
ing salaried employment as the base category. Those who are not employed are not very
different from those who are salaried in terms of their survey answer. Those who cur-
rently attend school are 8 percentage points more likely to answer “correctly”, although
that effect is only significant at the 10% level. Those who are self-employed without any
employees or with a family member providing unpaid labor to their business are 2 percent-
age points less likely to choose the stochastically dominated option, significant at the 5%
level. Those whose business is more established, as indicated by having at least one paid
employee, are 7.4 percentage points less likely to choose irrationally than are the salaried,
statistically significant at the 1% level. Perhaps running a business provides more practice
in decision-making, showing that losses may be temporary and not so painful. In forming
the reference point, a business owner may be more rational and consider both outcomes
equally, as opposed to anchoring on one or the other. Alternatively, it may be that those
who are more rational decision-makers choose to start a business or are able to expand
the business enough to hire employees.
3.5 Implications
Data from the IFLS indicate that a large fraction of the Indonesian population may avoid
risk at all costs – even when there is no risk discernible to a rational decision-maker. This
may partly be due to misunderstanding, but a lack of understanding does not appear
sufficient to fully explain the prevalence of this behavior. The choice to avoid gambles
may have evolved to be a kind of rule-of-thumb for some individuals. Perhaps through
the course of their lives they have learned that getting one’s hopes up only sets one up for
disappointment. A certain option not only guarantees the outcome, it also guarantees a
lack of surprises and a lack of painfully unmet expectations. If one harbors the slightest
hope of getting 2x, the gamble will disappoint if one does not get it – and the joy of
receiving the larger amount may be much less than the pain of not receiving it.
Particularly worrying is that those who are less educated or poorer appear to be more
prone to such total risk-avoidance. If growing up poor makes losses more painful (perhaps
because one is so close to having nothing), then the lesson learned each time expectations
are not met is that one should not have hoped for the good outcome. If one does not hope
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for the good outcome, then there is little point in trying for this outcome – may as well
choose the certain x, or may as well try to maintain the status quo. Loss aversion may
thus lead to up a poverty trap.
While responses to a single survey question may hold limited information, the observed
choices could hint as to why we see people in developing countries rejecting or being
hesitant to accept new measures which will “obviously” improve their lives. Farming
technologies tend to spread slowly (Conley and Udry, 2010; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995),
water bleaching or filtration devices see limited take-up and use (Kremer et al., 2008),
antimalarial bed nets are not used as much as they perhaps should be (Dupas, 2014).
It is possible that descriptions of the benefits are poorly understood (similar to saying
“equal chance” in the first question, the interpretation of which can be ambiguous). But
if the explanations are sufficient, then the more the individual believes in the benefits and
anchors on them, the greater looms the potential for disappointment. The individual may
still be strictly better off choosing the new way according to standard economic theory,
but if we account for the disappointment, she may in fact feel she would be worse off. This
is in line with what prior research has suggested (Yesuf and Bluffstone, 2009; Liu, 2013).
What the IFLS survey shows is that these preferences may lead people to turn down what
is economically an unambiguously better option. Not only may people under-invest in
risky opportunities as a result, they may under-invest even in what we would commonly
consider to be safe options.
The IFLS survey contains a number of measurements of household assets, including the
total rupiah value of “savings / certificate of deposit / stocks” owned by the household. We
would expect that being loss averse to the extent that one would choose a stochastically
dominated certain option over a lottery would lead one to under-invest in these assets,
especially something as uncertain as stocks. As Table 3.2 shows, this is indeed the case.
The relevant coefficient is labeled “Option 1”. This is a dummy variable indicating the
respondent chose the dominated certain option over the lottery in Question 1. The outcome
is a binary indicator for having any savings or investments in the household. As one
might expect, those who are wealthier, older, and more educated are more likely to have
some savings or invest in the stock market. It appears that women are also more likely
to record a positive response, even though they more frequently choose the dominated
option. Perhaps this is because the available measurement combines both savings and
investment. While loss aversion may lead women to under-invest, it may not have that
effect on their savings.
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Impact of loss aversion on savings/investment
Coefficient Std. Err.
Option 1 -.0241527∗∗∗ .0084723
Log annual income .0514719∗∗∗ .0035041
Age .0010426∗∗∗ .0003291
Female .0788371∗∗∗ .0069032
Attended Jr/Sr HS .1066841∗∗∗ .0098865
Attended tertiary .3199161∗∗∗ .0167967
Community feels safe -.001899 .0251086
Constant -.6437643∗∗∗ .0585025
n 12,721
Table 3.2: The outcome variable is a binary indicator for having any savings/investments
in the household. Option 1 corresponds to choosing the stochastically dominated certain
option over the lottery in Question 1. The education dummies correspond to highest level
of schooling attended. Errors are clustered at the household level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Controlling for the above characteristics, as well as community safety, those who choose the
dominated option are 2.4 percentage points less likely to have any savings or investments.
This may be due to loss aversion constraining their investment, or it may be due to
generally poor decision-making skills. The fraction of people in the sample who have any
savings or investments is 26.8%. A decrease of 2.4 percentage points thus corresponds to
a 9% decrease.
I also look into the amount reported under “savings / certificate of deposit / stocks”.
Conditional on reporting that the household owns any of these, those who choose the
dominated option report a smaller amount. The mean amount saved or invested among
those who choose “correctly” is Rp. 7,080,557, and among those who choose “incorrectly”
it is Rp. 5,697,038. The difference between the two groups is significant at the 5% level.
It thus appears that not only is choosing the dominated option associated with a lower
likelihood of having any savings or investments, but it is also associated with a lower
amount saved or invested if one does own these assets.
While establishing a causal relationship given the data constraints is not possible, I now
look at the possible impact of nonstandard/irrational decision-making on people’s employ-
ment choices. In particular, I build on the insights generated in the first chapter of this
thesis and look at selection into entrepreneurship. While it is not possible to determine
whether businesses are incorporated, I separate the businesses into “self-employed”, which
corresponds to a one-person business, potentially helped by an unpaid family member, and
“entrepreneurs”, who have at least one paid employee.
The IFLS questions contain four further decision-making questions which can be used to
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Entrepreneurship Self-employment
Risk tolerance .0038097∗∗∗ .0141824∗∗∗
(.0009614) (.0025257)
Option 1 .0019494 .0237007∗∗∗
(.0029169) (.0074884)
Attended Jr/Sr HS .0083919∗∗∗ -.1582432∗∗∗
(.0020963) (.0054067)
Attended tertiary .0205941∗∗∗ -.2413278∗∗∗
(.0031721) (.0084824)
Female -.0093222∗∗∗ -.1535218∗∗∗
(.0019950) (.0050377)
Constant .009454∗∗∗ .3954978∗∗∗
(.002938) (.0078124)
n 18,680 26,792
Table 3.3: The outcome variable in each regression is a dummy for the type of employment.
Option 1 corresponds to choosing the stochastically dominated certain option over the
lottery in Question 1. The education dummies correspond to highest level of schooling
attended. Risk tolerance is based on five bins taking values 0 to 4, which the latter
corresponding to higher risk tolerance. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
rank respondents from least to most risk tolerant. I thus assign values 1 through 4 to
respondents, correspondingly. Necessarily, those who choose the stochastically dominated
option in Question 1 must be assigned a risk tolerance value of 0; they are not asked the
other four questions.
For each type of business ownership, I regress the dummy for selecting this occupation
on education (as an imperfect proxy for ability), the risk tolerance measure, a dummy
for being female, and a binary indicator of having chosen the dominated option (labeled
Option 1). This allows for a further impact aside from through lowered risk tolerance,
such as if the group of people who choose the certain option are unusually loss averse or
more likely to anchor on high outcomes.
As expected, having a higher risk tolerance or being more educated is positively and
statistically significantly associated with entrepreneurship. The opposite is true for being
female. Indeed, there are only 93 female entrepreneurs to 250 male entrepreneurs. The
coefficient on Option 1 is not statistically significant. It does not appear that the factors
which lead an individual to choose the dominated option have any additional impact on the
likelihood of being an entrepreneur beyond what is controlled for by the other variables.
When it comes to self-employment, however, we observe a qualitatively different set of re-
sults. While the coefficients on risk tolerance and education remain statistically significant,
the coefficients on education are now negative. Those who are educated are much less likely
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to be running a small, one-person business. This is similar to what Levine and Rubinstein
(2017) find in their work comparing incorporated and unincorporated entrepreneurs in the
US. In addition, the coefficient on Option 1 is now positive and statistically significant.
Those who choose the dominated option are more likely to be running a one-person busi-
ness, even though their risk tolerance is low. This makes sense, as such businesses are
often the result of people having no other options to sustain themselves. It is possible a
high degree of loss aversion or otherwise impaired decision-making makes it difficult to find
a would-be-preferred salaried position. Alternatively, it may be that living in precarious
circumstances impacts both an individual’s preferences and their economic options. As
in the case of entrepreneurship, being a woman is associated with a lower probability of
running one’s own business.
3.6 Future research
Two factors influence an individual’s choice, according to the model. One is the indi-
vidual’s reference point and the other is their sensitivity to disappointment. In practice,
there are likely other additional channels which shape the person’s decision-making. To
fully rule out misinterpretation, it would be helpful to gather more data while very clearly
conveying the set-up in the question to individuals in a concrete way that is difficult to
misinterpret. The question has already been thoughtfully designed, but perhaps respon-
dents still don’t fully grasp that, for instance, there is no outcome in which the lottery in
Question 1 results in nothing. For example, Keren and Willemsen (2009) show that while
they can replicate the uncertainty effect as first noted by Gneezy et al. (2006), in their
sample it primarily comes from individuals misunderstanding the instructions. Rephrasing
the question to make the statement on probability very clear by describing it using a coin
flip resulted in participants’ responses no longer demonstrating the uncertainty effect.
Once the lack of understanding channel has been eliminated, one could explore the extent
to which loss aversion or reference point formation plays a role. According to the model
prediction, it should make no difference whether the tempting higher option in the question
is 2x or 3x, if the respondent continues to have the same p and β, propensity to anchor
on the lower option and the degree of loss aversion, respectively. Including this change
is unlikely to influence the respondent’s aversion to losses, but it may nudge respondents
towards a greater propensity towards anchoring on the higher outcome. For any given
level of loss aversion, individuals would then be more likely to turn down the gamble.
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To assess the extent to which loss aversion leads people to avoid potential disappointment,
one could measure the loss aversion of the respondents separately and then see if those who
report a greater degree of loss aversion are also more likely to choose the certain option
over the gamble in Question 1. Alternatively, one could rephrase the question to try to
make use of individuals’ loss aversion to nudge them towards the economically beneficial
answer and then see how responses change. We can do this by placing the outcomes in
the realm of potential losses, such as the following:
Suppose you are offered a way to earn some money which guarantees you Rp. 1.6
million per month. However, it requires you to choose one of the following two
options. With option 1, you are will certainly lose (have to pay back) Rp. 800
thousand of that income. With option 2, you have an equal chance of either losing
Rp. 800 thousand, or, if you are lucky, not losing any of the income. Which option
do you choose?
By taking a different perspective on the same outcomes, it may be possible to encourage
more rational decision-making in the respondents.
If disappointment aversion truly does drive individuals to reject risky gambles, even when
there is no risk involved in the traditional sense, this leads to some specific policy implica-
tions. As an example let’s take the situation observed by Liu (2013), where farmers had
the opportunity to adopt a genetically modified variant of cotton, which was advertised as
having an increased yield and requiring a lower amount of pesticide (lower cost), all while
being no riskier than the standard variety in terms of yield risk. Even so, some farmers
waited up to a decade to switch to the new technology. This example can be mapped
onto the set-up in Question 1 – either you choose to stick with the status quo, which is
x, or you try switching to the new variety. True, the new variety may give you better
profits, but what if it doesn’t work out and you still get the same as before? That would
be disappointing. As predicted by the model, more loss averse farmers adopt the new
technology later than those less loss averse.
If we wanted to encourage adoption of this new technology, a simple change in the messag-
ing may help. Instead of stating what the farmers stand to potentially gain, the phrasing
could emphasize what they are losing out on by not making the switch. Presenting the
switch as the default option and the lower yield as losses may encourage greater, faster
adoption, as loss aversion may nudge farmers towards rather than away from adoption.
Another potential approach could be to guarantee some payment if a farmer tries the new
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variety. In terms of the model, this would make the choice x vs equal chances of x+y and
2x+y, where y is the subsidy offered. The need for such a subsidy may seem preposterous
if one is dealing with rational decision-makers, but perhaps it is necessary to help some
individuals overcome their aversion to disappointment.
3.7 Conclusion
The IFLS survey conducted in Indonesia in 2007 presents us with some unexpected results.
When nearly half of the sample selects a stochastically dominated option, it is difficult
to write it off as simply noise in the data, some random mistakes. Yet even if these are
mistakes, the magnitude observed makes it important to understand why people choose
as they do and to account for this in policies which rely on individuals’ ability to make
“obviously” better, rational choices for themselves. In light of other behavioral economics
research that has documented psychological considerations that markedly affect decision-
making, from the way scarcity can affect perceived value (Shah et al., 2015) to preferences
that indicate hyperbolic discounting (Dasgupta and Maskin, 2005), perhaps the choices
observed in the IFLS survey are not so surprising.
I believe the responses recorded are thoughtful and intentional for the majority of respon-
dents. It is likely that some respondents do not fully understand the question posed, but
this does not seem to be enough to explain the scale of the “mistake” observed – nearly
half the sample, including some of the most highly-educated individuals. This paper pro-
poses that individuals choose the dominated option based on a high degree of loss aversion
in combination with anchoring on the desired high outcome. It may seem prudent or sen-
sible for a person to try to avoid disappointment, but it might lead them to turn down
opportunities which any rational decision-maker would find obviously worth accepting.
Of course, there may be other possible explanations. Further research is needed to more
fully understand the process by which individuals make the kinds of choices exemplified
in the IFLS question, and to take this decision-making process into consideration when
designing policy interventions.
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